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Introductory overview
This thesis aims at contributing to the analysis of the issues o f collusion and mergers 
from an industrial organization perspective. The thesis is composed of three main chapters. 
In what follows each of those chapters will be discussed in greater detail. In particular, I 
will briefly describe the model considered in each chapter, its relation to the literature, and 
the contribution each chapter makes to the existing literature.
Chapter one deals with the issue of entry and collusion both theoretically and em­
pirically. In particular, it re-considers Green and Porter’s (1984) model of collusion with 
imperfect monitoring (in the price version, as in Tirole’s (1988) textbook). In this model 
with homogeneous goods, a firm can either charge the monopoly price to share the mar­
ket with other firms or secretly undercut its rivals to get the whole market. Since market 
demand is affected by stochastic factors, firm’s demand could be zero even when no firm 
is deviating. Given that the only available information to each firm is its own sales, it is 
difficult for them to infer whether a low demand is caused by a secret price cut or it is 
just due to a “bad” demand shock. In equilibrium, the firms need to start a price-war (i.e., 
charge the competitive price) when the demand is zero to maintain the incentive to charge 
the monopoly price in the collusive phases. As a result, a price-war occurs with positive 
probability as an equilibrium phenomenon.
New in this chapter is the existence of potential entrants in the cartel. The chapter 
examines the structure and success of a cartel, of the type described above, when there ex- 
ists a pool of potential entrants. To do so, a no-entry condition has to be taken into account
1
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Introductory overview 2
in addition to the standard incentive compatibility constraint to maintain the collusive price 
level in the collusive phases. A potential entrant is assumed to enter the market (and the 
cartel) in any period (which is an irreversible decision) if its benefit from a continuation 
equilibrium exceeds the initial entry fixed sunk cost. Hence, how incumbent firms react 
to an entrant is important to determine how severe the no-entry constraint is. Two differ­
ent incumbents’ response to entry are considered: (t) reversion to finite-punishment phase, 
and (u ) accommodation of entrants. Naturally, it is shown that the no-entry constraint is 
most difficult to be satisfied when incumbent firms accommodate the entrant, which was 
actually the case for the entry episodes for the nineteenth-century US railroad cartel whose 
pricing decisions are discussed in the applied part o f the chapter.
The chapter shows that the optimal length of a price war increases as the number of 
firms in the cartel agreement increases if  and only if  the entry cost is so high that the no­
entry constraint is not binding. The intuition that underlies this result is simple. When there 
are more firms in the agreement, each firm has a smaller share of the market. Then, first, the 
gain from secret price cutting becomes larger as a deviating firm can obtain a larger share 
of the market, and, second, each firm’s continuation payoff in the collusive equilibrium 
decreases, which reduces the impact o f any finite-period punishment. Combining these 
two effects, one concludes that the duration of a “price-war” has to increase to maintain 
the incentive for the firms to stick to the collusive price.
Since the demand shock is assumed to be independent and identically distributed 
(i.i.d.), the probability to trigger a price-war is the same for every period in a collusive 
phase. Given this, it is also shown that the percentage of periods spent in a price-war in-
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creases with the length of the punishment phase, and hence with the number of active firms 
in the cartel (if entry costs are sufficiently large). Using Porter’s weekly data set on the 
Joint Executive Committee (JEC) from 1880 to the 16th week of 1886, the chapter does 
find empirical support for the hypotheses that entry increases the probability of observ­
ing a breakdown of the cartel, and that it increases the length of the punishment period. 
Interestingly, Porter (1985) found support for the latter but not for the former.
Chapter two contributes to the analysis of the nature of the difficulty for collusion 
when firms differ in “size”, depending on the underlying reason which explains the dif­
ferences in firms’ sizes. In particular, the chapter analyses the conditions under which 
an industry-wide collusive outcome can be supported when an infinitely repeated game is 
played between asymmetric quantity setting firms which produce a homogeneous product. 
Following Perry and Porter (1985), asymmetries are dealt with by assuming that firms can 
have a different share of a specific asset (say, capital) which affects marginal costs. In this 
context, a firm is considered “large” if it owns a large fraction of the capital stock, and 
“small” if it owns only a restricted proportion of the capital available in the industry. The 
model assumes that firms use optimal punishment strategies with a stick and carrot struc­
ture in the style of the ones which have been characterized in general by Abreu (1986, 
1988). In particular, Abreu’s work is extended to consider a class of “proportional penal 
codes” (that is, along the punishment path firms produce in proportion to their assets).
The chapter’s main results can be summarized as follows. First, it is shown that 
firms’ incentives to disrupt the collusive agreement crucially depend on the distribution 
of assets amongst firms involved in the agreement. Second, from the analysis of the im-
ijfTon«
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pact o f changes in the distribution of asset holdings (due to mergers, transfers or split-offs) 
on the sustainability of tacit collusion, it is found that if a merger (or other asset transfer) 
induces a more even distribution of assets, this tends to foster collusion. These results em­
body interesting implications for practical application of competition policy. In particular, 
the conclusions of this chapter shed some light on the analysis of the complex problem 
of assessing how a merger would affect collusion possibilities, an issue widely debated in 
today’s competition policy (under the name of joint dominance, which refers to the possi­
bility that firms reach a collusive outcome after a merger). The analysis clearly suggests 
that asymmetries in cost functions should be taken into consideration when predictions are 
made regarding the facility of collusion after an asset transfer takes place. In addition, 
our results confirm that, as initially stressed by Compte Jenny and Rey (1997) and more re­
cently by Kuhn and Motta (1999), a systematic analysis of market shares and concentration 
indexes does not always provide a reliable guide to evaluate potential effects on the level 
of competition in the market induced by an horizontal meiger.
Chapter three aims at providing empirically testable implications regarding the rela­
tionship between market size and concentration in endogenous sunk cost industries (Sutton 
(1991, 1998)), that is, industries where firms are involved in research and development 
(henceforth, R&D) activities with the aim of enhancing the perceived quality of their prod­
ucts. Sutton (1991, 1998) has shown that in industries of this type very fragmented out­
comes cannot arise as equilibrium outcomes in large markets. He shows that, under very 
general conditions, a lower bound to concentration exists and is bounded away from zero, 
no matter how large the market is. However, as pointed out by Bresnahan (1992) and
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Scherer (2000), an important question left open by Sutton’s analysis is whether an upper 
bound to the degree of concentration can be characterized in this type of industries. Chapter 
three addresses this question by extending the linear-demand model with horizontal product 
differentiation proposed by Sutton (1998). The chapter incorporates a post-entry additional 
stage into Sutton’s framework, where firms may endogenously form coalitions. By forming 
coalitions (meiging), firms cooperate and eliminate duplication efforts in R&D activities to 
enhance product quality. Hence, apart from reducing competition in the market, a merger 
allows firms to realize a cost advantage over the unmerged rivals.
A novel feature of this chapter is that it employs a coalitional stability concept which 
assumes that firms are endowed with foresight, in the sense that when making merger 
decisions, they look ahead and anticipate the ultimate outcome of their actions. This chapter 
is, therefore, related to a relatively new strand of the literature on farsighted stability (see, 
for instance, Chwe (1994), Xue (1998) and Diamantoudi andXue (2001)).
The analysis leads to the following two main conclusions. First, independently of the 
size of the market, arbitrarily concentrated outcomes can arise in equilibrium. Therefore, 
this chapter shows that in endogenous sunk cost industries, an upper bound to concentration 
exists and is independent of the size of the market. Interestingly, in some equilibria in which 
a merger to monopoly is the unique equilibrium outcome, it turns out that firms belonging 
to the monopoly ‘grand’ coalition earn strictly positive profits even under the threat of entry. 
Second, it is also shown that if products are sufficiently good substitutes (or, if investment 
in R&D is sufficiently effective), duopoly coalition structures can only arise in equilibrium
mmm m
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if composed of sufficiently size asymmetric coalitions. The results, therefore, complement 
those o f Sutton (1991,1998).
Finally, as a practical remark, it should be stressed that all chapters of this thesis are 
self-contained and, therefore, can be read independently from each other as an independent 
article. This has the advantage that readers who are interested in only a part of the work 
presented here can gain easy access to their point o f interest.
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Chapter 1
Entry Effects on Cartel Stability and the Joint
Executive Committee
1.1 Introduction
The objective of this chapter is twofold. From a theoretical perspective, the chapter con­
tributes to the analysis of entry effects on cartel stability under demand uncertainty. From a 
more applied perspective, we empirically test some theoretical predictions about how entry 
can affect the pattern of collusive behavior of a group of firms organized in a cartel agree­
ment to coordinate prices, making use of data on the US railroad cartel of the tum-of-the 
century.
We develop an extended version of the model proposed by Green and Porter (1984). 
In their seminal article, Green and Porter analyze infinitely repeated oligopoly games where 
market demand is subject to exogenous shocks and the firm’s (past) actions are not observ­
able, but they do not consider the possibility of entry. We thus reexamine their model to 
understand how the stability of the collusive price structure can be influenced by an in­
crease in the number of firms in the agreement or by the existence of a pool of potential 
competitors.
The framework we use in order to explicitly model the entry process is related to 
Harrington (1989). We study two types of collusive equilibria in a repeated Bertrand game 
(with random demand and unobservable prices) between a set of active firms and a set of
7
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1.1 Introduction
potential competitors that can enter the market by paying a one-time, fixed, sunk cost (entry 
cost). In a collusive equilibrium, the initially active firms have no incentive to cut prices 
in non-reversionary periods (because this would trigger a “price war”) and the potential 
entrants have no incentive to enter, because the present value of the expected profits from 
entering the cartel is not sufficient to cover the entry cost. In the first type of equilibrium 
it is expected that entry would trigger a price war. In the second type of equilibrium it is 
expected that entry would be accommodated with a more inclusive agreement. It should be 
noted, however, that a major difference exists between the model developed in this chapter 
and Harrington’s (1989) framework. While Harrington’s results are obtained in a context 
of almost perfect information,1 our analysis restricts the information available to firms, in 
the sense that at each period of time, apart from past entry decisions a firm knows only its 
own past prices and output levels. We find that entry does reduce the scope of collusion 
under both types of equilibria. In addition, in contrast with what the previous literature 
has pointed out with respect to the experience of the US railroad cartel, it is shown that, 
from an ex-ante point of view, the existence of a pool of competitors is a more important 
constraint on the maintenance of a stable agreement when a potential entrant expects to 
be accommodated by incumbents if entry occurs. We then look for empirical evidence 
on the role played by entry using the data set from the experience of the Joint Executive 
Committee (henceforth JEC), a pre-Sherman Act (legal) cartel.
The Green and Porter (1984) model has been subject to previous empirical tests us­
ing the JEC data set. The model suggests that in industries working in a context of imper-
i In the model he presents there are simultaneous moves at each stage of the dynamic game.
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feet observability, price patterns include shifts between collusive regimes and competitive 
regimes along the collusive equilibrium path. Porter (1983b) and Ellison (1994), among 
others, demonstrated the existence of such regime shifts while examining this railroad car­
tel.2 In another paper, which is probably the closest to the empirical application developed 
in this study, Porter (1985), still using the JEC data set, analyzes empirically the determi­
nants of both frequency and duration of competitive reversions of finite length. The main 
goal of the econometric work developed by Porter was to determine whether the JEC was 
less successful in maintaining cooperative prices because of entry of new firms. To this 
end, he ran regressions for both the full sample and two subsets of the overall sample in 
which there were structural changes due to entry occurrence, to test for the impact of entry 
on the likelihood of a price war beginning. As noted by Porter himself, using the incidence 
of competitive episodes reported by the press at the time as the dependent variable, the re­
sults obtained are quite discouraging. Using the same data set but considering a different 
specification of the econometric model and creating new variables to explore what causes 
price wars to occur, our findings confirm the predictions of the reexamined version of the 
Green and Porter (1984) model presented in this chapter. In particular, unlike Porter, we 
find that a larger number of firms in the industry increases the percentage of periods spent 
in a price war. Two different forces justify this result. First, the higher number of firms 
in the agreement is, the higher the (one-shot) incentives to disrupt the collusive agreement 
are. Second, as is shown theoretically and contrary to what Porter (1985) claims,3 the opti-
2 However, while Porter (1983b) obtained the result that firms’ price cost mark-ups were consistent with a 
Cournot behavior, Ellison (1994), allowing for serial correlation in the demand between periods, came to the 
conclusion that cartel members were setting prices collusively between price wars.
3 See Porter (1985, p. 419).
1*WUI HHKMM HU W
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mal punishment length is always increasing with the number of firms in the basic version 
of the model and increases as well with the number of active firms when entry is explicitly 
modeled, as long as the entry (sunk) costs are sufficiently high.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 includes a brief description of the 
structural features of the basic theoretical model and some preliminary predictions about 
entry effects on cartel stability. The structure presented is based entirely upon the model 
developed in Green and Porter (1984). Departures from their assumptions are noted be­
low. In Section 1.3 we develop the central analytical argument, extending the analysis o f 
the preceding section to consider the possibility of entry of new firms. Section 1.4 briefly 
reviews the operations of the JEC. A description of the data used in the empirical applica­
tion and the estimation results are provided in sections 1.5 and 1.6, respectively. Section 
1.7 contains some concluding comments.
i
1.2 The basic model
Following Tirole (1988), we will develop a model in the spirit of Green and Porter (1984) 
in which a cartel is sustained by oligopolistic firms acting noncooperatively in a context of 
demand uncertainty.4 In this section we briefly remind the reader of the main features of 
this well-known model for the case where entry is not allowed. In the following Section 
1.3, we extend the model to analyze entry.
4 We depart from Tirole’s approach by considering that there are n firms in the agreement rather than two 
and also by allowing for a wider range of possible prices along the collusive path.
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1.2 The basic model 11
There exist n  firms producing a homogeneous good and facing the same unit cost 
c. Firms choose prices in every period. Demand fluctuates randomly and its realizations 
are assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over time. In each period 
there are two possible states of nature. With probability a  the demand is zero (“low-demand 
state”) and there is a positive demand with probability (1 — a ) (the “high-demand state”). 
In the latter case, demand is split into equal parts corresponding to those firms charging the 
lowest price.
Firms do not observe their rivals’ prices. Thus, from the point of view of each single 
firm in a cartel, a low demand for its product may be due to either secret price cutting by 
some competitors or a bad market demand shock.
A strategy, that is, a contingent plan of action, for a firm i in the repeated game is 
an infinite sequence 5 t- =  (5?, S } , S J ,...), where Sj* €  R+ is a determinate initial price 
level, and Sf : (R+Y -+ R+ is a function that maps the prices charged and quantities faced 
by firm i in periods 1,2 ,..., t — 1 into a price p-, for firm i in period t. In this game, we look 
for a Nash equilibrium with the strategy for the i - th  player defined in the following way:
P . (1.1)
.... W“1^ - 1))
p* if qI 1 > 0, pi' 1 = p *  , or
Vr € [f -  T ,t -  1], pj =  pc, qj > 0. 
p c otherwise
( 1 . 2)
where i =  1, 2,..., ( ( g ° , p ° ) (iÌ“ 1^ * “ 1)) *s the partial history with length t observed 
by firm p* e  (pc, Pm] is the collusive price, while pc and pm represent the competitive 
and the monopoly price, respectively.
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In words, the game lasts forever and initially each firm charges the collusive price. As 
soon as one of the n  firms in the cartel observes a zero demand (and, therefore, earns zero 
profits), a punishment phase of T  periods is triggered in which every firm adopts a Bertrand 
behavior.5 At the end of the reversionary episode all firms return to collusive behavior and 
share the collusive profit (II*) until a zero demand is again observed by some (or all) firms.6 
Note that the length of the optimal punishment period can be neither zero nor infinite.
Let V* represent the present discounted value of a firm’s profit from date t on, as­
suming that date t belongs to a collusive phase. Analogously, let V~ denote the present 
discounted value of a firm’s profit from date t on, assuming that date t is the beginning of 
a punishment period.7 In this context we have:
Equation (1.3) says that with probability (1 — a) the demand state is high, each firm 
earns its share of the collusive profit and the game remains in the collusive phase, and thus 
each firm has the valuation V^ + . However, with probability a ,  the “low-demand state” is 
achieved and in the next period a punishment phase starts. Equation (1.4) gives the present
5 As was pointed out by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), “no player can gain by deviating in the punishment 
phase, since play there is a fixed number of repetitions of a static equilibrium.” (p. 186).
6 In the light of Abreu et at (1986), we know that it is possible that a global optimum might not be 
achieved with Nash reversion. However, since the competitive price Nash equilibrium achieves the minmax 
payoff profile, there is no room for a stronger punishment than Nash reversion in this setting.
7 Because of stationarity, neither V *  and V~ depend on time. In addition, the subscripts denote the number 
of firms in the agreement.
and,
(1.4)
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discounted value of the expected stream of profits at the beginning of the punishment phase 
phase.
By solving the system of equations (1.3) and (1.4) one obtains:
V* 1 —(1 - a ) S - a S 1+T
V r  =
„  ,n *  
(i -  “ ) — .n (1.5)
M ,n *
n (1.6)" 1 — (1 — a )  6 — a£1+r
As we have seen, cartel members’ strategies (1.1) and (1.2) prescribe a mechanism 
to punish deviations from the price structure agreed upon. Whether this punishment mech­
anism is self-enforcing will depend on the trade-off between potential short-run gains from 
deviation and the present value of expected future losses. This trade-off is captured by the 
analysis of the incentive compatibility constraint:
i• i
:i
V* > (1 -  a) (IT  +  SV-)  +  a  ( iV " )  , (1.7)
where 6 € (0,1) is the common discount factor. The right-hand side of the inequality shows 
that if the demand is high and the firm decides to undercut, it earns all the one-shot collusive 
profit, but by deviating it will trigger a punishment reversal in the following T  periods. If 
the demand is zero, it will earn zero profits in the current period and a punishment phase 
starts in the next period.
Using equation (1.3) we can rewrite the incentive compatibility constraint in the fol­
lowing way:
s (K+ -  v~) > n* -  51. (i.8)
'  n
b r u s i i « » - *
I I U I X ^
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This relation says that a prospective deviant will decide to respect the agreement if  
the present discounted value of the long-run net gain from collusion is greater than the 
short-run gain from deviation.
The next proposition derives the optimal length of the punishment period T* as a  
function of the parameters in the model and shows that it is increasing in the number o f 
firms belonging to the agreement. The intuition which underlies this result is simple. On 
the one hand, when more firms belong to the collusive agreement, the gain from secret price 
cutting becomes larger as the deviating firm can obtain more share. On the other hand, 
each firm ’s continuation payoff in the collusive equilibrium decreases, which reduces the 
impact o f any finite-period punishment. Combining these two effects, one concludes that 
the optimal length of the punishment has to increase in order to maintain the incentive for 
the firms to stick to the collusive price.
Proposition  1 I f  the number o f firms is sufficiently low, i.e.,n  <  1 /(1  — <5(1 — a)), the 
optimal punishment length T* is determined by
T *  =  —  In n (1 - g (1 ~ Q) ) ~  1 
ln5  6 (an — 1)
where T* is an increasing function o f the number o f firms in the agreement.
Proof, Substituting (1.5) and (1.6) into (1.8), some algebra shows that, in order for the 
incentive compatibility constraint to hold, one must have that:
n —1 < <5T+1 (cm -  1) +  ¿ n (1 — a ) , (1.9)
rm linn tUUUUMUUhWUUMMutm
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where we assume a  < 1 /n  in order for the r.h.s. of eq. (1.9) to increase with T. As Tirole 
(1988) and others have mentioned, the optimal punishment length T* should be chosen to 
maximize the discounted joint profits and, therefore, should be the minimal T  for which 
eq. (1.8) (or, equivalently, (1.9)) holds. Rewriting (1.9), one obtains:
T ^  n  — 1 — ¿n (1 — a )
81 < 8 (an  — 1) ( 1. 10)
which in turn implies that
- l n<5  ¿ ( a n - 1) ’ ( 1. 11)
where, since a  <  1/n ,  one must have that n  <  1/  (1 — 8 (1 — a ))  in order for T* to exist. 
Now, taking the derivative of T * with respect to the number of firms, one obtains:
dT* (1 -  a) (1 -8 ) (U 2 )dn  In 8 (on  — 1) (n (1 — 8 (1 — a)) — 1)7
which is always positive given that, as already mentioned, o  < 1/ n  and n < l / ( l - 6 ( l  — a )). 
This completes the proof. ■
First, it should be stressed that an optimal punishment length only exists if the number 
of firms in the agreement is sufficiently low. Otherwise, the cartel is never (internally) 
stable. Second, and most importantly, notice that this result is in sharp contrast with what 
Porter (1985) indicates as a possibility, i.e., that as the number of firms increases, “the cartel 
may want to employ shorter, and so more forgiving, punishments when reversions occur, 
in order to partially offset the increased fraction of time spent at competitive prices.” (p. 
419). This result will play a central role in the explanation of the main hypothesis tested 
in the empirical section of this chapter, namely that cartel stability is negatively correlated 
with the number of firms in the cartel agreement.
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1.3 Considering entry
We will now describe a new version of the Green and Porter (1984) model in which the 
entry process is modeled explicitly. We will study a particular subset of the set of Perfect 
Bayesian Equilibria. In particular, we will assume that once entry occurs, incumbent firms 
can either engage in aggressive behavior for a while (Case 1) or accommodate the new 
entrants (Case 2).8 Throughout the analysis of each of these cases, we will first give the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a non-trivial degree of collusion to be sustainable 
and characterize the optimal length of the punishment period which is required by the 
equilibrium conditions. We then explore the stability issue in further detail, by analyzing 
the determinants of the proportion of periods spent by the cartel in price wars.
1.3.1 The new model structure
Assume a countably infinite number of active and inactive firms represented by the set 
Z. A 1 C  Z, where the inclusion is strict, denotes the set o f active firms in period t and 
¡A*] =  TV* (where |A*| is the number o f elements of A*).9 Hence, Z  — A* represents the set 
of potential entrants in each period t. Further, let both active and inactive firms have the 
same marginal costs of production.
8 We are not considering here the situation where incumbent firms coordinate their behavior to force an 
entrant to exit from the industry. During the operation of the JEC, it was common knowledge that new 
competitors faced a “no-exit constraint”. As a consequence, “it would not be rational for a railroad cartel to 
engage in predatory pricing practices in response to entry.” (Porter 1985, p. 420). Thus, we have decided not 
to cover predatory pricing here, since it is clear that the use of this kind of threat against potential entrants will 
not have been credibly carried out by the railroad firms belonging to the nineteenth-century railroad cartel, 
whose pricing strategies we will discuss in the applied part of this chapter.
9 Firm i is considered active at time t (z e  A 1) if it faces a positive demand in that period.
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We also assume that, for a potential entrant, entry and price decisions are not simul­
taneous. At each period t, the Ari active firms simultaneously announce the price to charge 
(p- denotes the 2-th firm’s price in period i). At the same time, potential entrants decide 
about entry. A one-time entry (sunk) cost K  (where K  >  0) has to be incurred if entry 
takes place. It allows the firm to begin production one period later. Hence, prices are a 
post-entry decision for a potential competitor and past entry decisions are assumed to be 
perfectly observed by all active firms.10
If a firm i is initially active (i € A0), its overall strategy - S* - can be represented 
as an infinite sequence of action functions (one for each period) Si = (£?, S } , 5*,...), 
where Sf €  R+ represents the initial price charged by firm i and Sj : (/?+ x 2Z)* —► R+. 
The domain of an action function 5J is the Cartesian product between the set of feasible 
prices pj, the set of possible outputs11 qj and the set of active firms in period r ,  where 
r  6  {0, ...,f — 1}. The range of 5* is represented by the set of possible prices that firm i 
can charge in period t. Hence, period t action function of an arbitrary active firm i tells it 
which price to set in the t—th period as a function of the feasible histories observed over 
the periods {0, t — 1}.
More formally:
where A0) , (g}”1,/?!-1 , Ai-1))  is the partial history with length t observed by
firm i, which is denoted by h\ G H\. Notice that h\ can be partitioned into the public partial
10 Entry is generally a time-consuming process; therefore, following Harrington (1989), we assume that 
incumbent firms are able to change their price decisions in response to entry.
11 q\ is the demand faced by firm i in period t.
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history (>4°,..., A*"1) and the private partial history ((g ° ,p °),... ,  (g*-1*?!-1)) observed by  
firmi.
I f  firm i is instead initially inactive (i 6 (Z  — A0)), then its overall strategy is Ei =  
(£{\ E } , ..., E l , ...). In the first period of the game (f =  0), E f  €  {Out, In} x {oo}, where 
Out means “Do Not Enter the Market” and In means “Enter the Market” . Moreover, with 
respect to the price decision, the set of feasible prices is a singleton.12 For each period 
t € {1 ,2 ,...} , there exists an action function E\, which, given the history observed up to  
period t — 1, tells the firm whether or not to enter at the beginning of period (t -f 1). We 
consider entry as an irreversible decision. Thus, if  entry occurs, firm i ’s strategy specifies 
the prices to be charged for the remainder of the horizon. The observed (partial) history 
is composed by the own price and entry decisions and by the demand faced by the firm 
up to the previous period. In formal terms, E\ :H\-+ {Out, In} x {R+ U {oo}}, where 
HjC  ({Out, In} x R\) .  Moreover,
V h\ €  Hi, if (..., {xjypjj qj) , ...), where x j  = Out, then g[ +1 =  0.
It should be also noted that:
El ((Out, o o ,0 ) ,..., (Out, oc,0)) €  {Out, In} x {oo} ,
while
El ((Out, o c , 0 ) , (In, oo ,0)) €  {In} x  R+.
12 The only feasible price is p® =  oo, thus the firm will not face a positive demand in the first period of the 
game.
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In the discussion that follows, we will identify, for each of the considered cases of 
post-entry reaction, the conditions which should be satisfied in order for the incumbent 
firms to sustain a non-trivial degree of market power without giving rise to either internal 
or external defection. Following Harrington (1991), we consider that internal defection 
takes place when some active firm secretly undercuts the price while external defection 
occurs if some potential competitor decides to enter the m arket13
1.3.2 Case 1. Cartel Breakdown
In this case we consider a situation in which incumbent firms respond to entry by reverting 
to competitive pricing for a finite length of time (T  periods). Since we want to understand 
how incumbent firms effectively sustain collusion, avoiding not only internal deviations 
for profit, but also entry of new competitors, an active firm’s strategy is designed in the 
following way:
S ? = p \
if q j'1 >  0, pl~l — p* and A* =  A l~l , or 
Vr 6  [t -  -  1] , pj = pc, q j>  0 and A T =  Ar~l
otherwise
(1.13)
(1-14)
where t — 1, 2, . . . ,  i £ A°t N° = |v4°| =  n.
Hence, the incumbent firms charge the collusive price (p*) at the beginning of the 
game and continue to set it as long as no firm faces a zero demand and no entry occurs. 
However, if some firm (active or inactive) has deviated from the proposed path or if a
13 Note that the basic framework of Section 1.2 can be viewed as a special case of the extended model we 
present in this section, where the entry sunk cost is prohibitive (K  —+ oo) and, therefore, external stability is 
not an issue.
■<
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low-demand state has occurred, then the collusive price is reestablished after a (temporary) 
punishment phase.
Our aim is to find a trigger strategy equilibrium such that strategies (1.13), (1.14) are 
optimal and there is no incentive for the entry of new firms into the industry. To this end, 
consider the following strategy for a potential entrant:
E f  =  Out
E! Out
Si
if  i e Z - A l 
if i €  A 1
(1.15)
(1.16)
where t =  1, 2, . . . ,  i € Z  — A 0.
This strategy calls for a potential entrant not to enter the industry. However, if the 
firm decides to enter, then the strategy also prescribes the price conduct which it should 
follow after its entry.14 Remember that the incumbents will react to entry by setting a price 
pc during a finite punishment period. Hence, once inside the market, the best response o f  
the entrant is to set pc during the punishment period which is triggered by its entry, since 
the Bertrand solution constitutes a Nash equilibrium for the one-shot price game which is 
played in each single-period, given the number of active firms in the industry.
A free entry trigger strategy equilibrium is defined as a triple (p*, Tj, such that 
the strategies in (1.13)-(1.16) form a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). The following 
two conditions are necessary and sufficient for (1.13)-(1.16) to form a PBE:15
s {Y+ -  V -)  > n* -  2 1  (1.17)
14 It should follow the strategy of an initially active firm (strategy (1.14)) for the remainder of the horizon.
15 Notice that subgame perfection cannot be used as the equilibrium concept. This is a dynamic game with 
unobservable actions in which the only proper subgame is the whole game itself. Moreover, active firms are 
able to observe actions which are off the equilibrium path (remember that they know the set of active firms in 
the past periods).
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and,
6V~+ l- K <  0. (1.18)
Notice that not only the collusive price, but also the length of the punishment are 
chosen (optimally) by the cartel to maximize the expected discounted joint profit subject 
to the constraints (1.17) and (1.18). As can be easily verified from equation (1.5), Vn+ is a 
decreasing function of T.
As in Section 2, expression (1.17) represents the incentive compatibility constraint. 
In Proposition 1, it has been shown that this constraint holds as long as the punishment 
length is large enough. In particular, if T  >  T \  where T* is given by eq. (1.11), then each 
of the n* active firms finds it optimal to go along with the collusive path and to charge the 
collusive price p* since the discounted loss from cheating is greater than the one-shot gain 
from deviation. On the other hand, condition (1.18) makes further entry into the industry 
unprofitable. Thus, when this latter condition holds, existing profits might be positive 
because profits with further entry16 are expected to be negative, which means that “Out” is, 
in fact, a best response for an inactive firm.17
In what follows, the optimal punishment length in a cartel breakdown scenario is 
derived and characterized.
Proposition 2 Let T* be as in Proposition 1. In a scenario in which incumbent firms 
respond to entry by reverting to a price war during a finite length o f time, and assuming
16 Defined net of the (sunk) costs of entry.
17 The condition in (1.18) can be interpreted as a violation of the participation constraint corresponding to 
the pool of potential competitors.
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0 <  K  <  (117 (71* + 1)) (1/(1 —8)), the optimal punishment length T\ is given by Tj =  
m ax {T*, Tpci}, where
1 K  (n* + 1  -  8 (1 -  a) (ra* + 1))
^  I n i  ¿ ( ( l - a j n '  +  t f a i n ’ +  l) )  '
Proof. From Proposition 1, we know that the incentive compatibility constraint (1.17) 
holds if  and only if T  >  T*, where T* is defined by eq. (1.11). Now, using eq. (1.6), it is 
straightforward to show that:18
6r
V" ,+1 1 —(1 —a ) < 5 - a i 1+r (1 Q)
IP
n* - f 1 ( U 9 )
Hence, substituting (1.19) into eq. (1.18), some algebra shows that incumbent firms will 
be able to coordinate their price strategies without giving rise to entry of new competitors 
if and only if:
^ r'+ i <  K  (n * +  1) (1 ~  (1 ~  <*) Æ) (1.20)
(1 — a ) II* +  K a  ( tz* 4* 1)
The l.h.s. o f condition (1.20) is easily seen to be decreasing in T'. Notice also that
when K  >  ( p ^ ),19 the r.h.s. of condition (1.20) is greater than or equal to one and,
therefore, condition (1.20) is trivially satisfied. Let us, therefore, consider in what follows
the case in which K  <  — ^ (tt$)- If this is the case, some algebra shows that condition
(1.18) holds if and only if
>  J _  In K  (re* +  1 ~  6 i1 ~  tt> fo* +  ^  =  T  
In 8 ó ( ( l - a ) n * + t f a ( n .  +  l)) “  pcl‘
18 We here obviously assume that the length of a price war depends on the number of active firms in the 
agreement. Hence, given that V~.+1 is computed for a case in which there are n* + 1  firms in the agreement, 
notice that we are now considering a general value T' (different from the one used in V~., T).
19 When this is the case, entry (sunk) costs are extremely high (say, prohibitive) and, therefore, external 
stability is not an issue.
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Hence, the minimum length of the punishment period for which both the incentive 
and the participation constraints (eqs. (1.17) and (1.18)) hold is given by
f \  =  max {T% Xpd}. ■
Two important remarks are in order at this point. First, using (1.21) it can be easily 
shown that
dTpci 1____________ IT  (1 -  a)___________
dn* In 6 (n* + 1) ((1 — a) II* +  K a  (n* +  1)) ’ ( 1.22)
and
dT,pci 1 n* (1 -  a) < 0. (1.23)d K  In 6 (II* (1 -  o r )  +  K a  (n* +  1)) K
It should be stressed at this point that the initial number o f firms n* is a parameter
of the model affecting the viability of collusive agreements. In equilibrium, the number 
of firms does not change, and so it makes sense to do comparative statics with respect to 
n*. Let us now turn to the interpretation of the previous results. From (1.22), it can be 
concluded that the greater the number of firms in the agreement or the higher the height of 
the entry barriers is, the lower will be the length of the punishment period which must exist 
in order to avoid entry and allow incumbents to sustain a non-trivial degree of cooperation. 
Second, eq. (1.23) calls attention to the fact that for sufficiently high values of the entry 
(sunk) cost, condition (1.18) is non-binding. In particular, and as already mentioned in the 
proof of Proposition 2, if K  > II /(n  + 1 ) (1 / (1 — 6)),20 then (1.18) is trivially satisfied. In 
the next Lemma, however, tighter predictions are given regarding the ranking between the 
two relevant thresholds for the punishment length, T* and Tpcl.
20 That is, the value of the entry cost is higher than or equal to the present value of individual shares in the 
collusive profits in case no punishment is triggered in the future periods.
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Lem m a 1 Let T\, T ' and Tpci be as in Proposition 2. T\ =  T* if and only if K  > K\> 
where
K  n* (1 — n* (1 — 5 (1 — q ))) 
1 n* +  1 1 — 6
Proof. Making use o f( l .l l)a n d (1 .2 1 ) , some algebra shows that T* > Tpci if and only 
if
(1 -  n* (1 -  6 (1 -  a )))  ((1 -  a) IP  +  K a (n* + 1 ))
(1 — a n *) K  (n* +  1) (1 — S +  ¿a) “
which in turn implies that
(1.24)
n * ( l - n » ( l - g ( l - o ) ) )  
"  n* + 1  1 - 5 = K l
Hence, when K  >  K\, T\ =  m ax {T *, Tpa} =  T*. ■
(1.25)
In words, Lemma 1 shows that for sufficiently high values of the entry (sunk) cost K> 
the incentive compatibility constraint is the one that is binding and, therefore, the optimal 
length of the punishment is given by the minimum value of T  for which this incentive 
constraint is satisfied, T\ — T *. As the next Corollary shows, this result is important to 
understand what is, in this case of the extended version of the model, the impact of entry 
on the duration of the optimal length of the punishment phase.
Corollary 1 Let K \ be as in Lemma 1. The optimal length o f the punishment in a cartel 
breakdown scenario, Ti, increases with the number offirms if  and only if K  >  K\.
Proof. If K \ < K  < (II*/(n* +  1 ))(1 /(1  — 5)), then applying Proposition 2 and 
Lemma 1, one concludes that T\ = T*. Now, from (1.12) we know that |^ r  >  0. If, 
instead, K  > + 1)) (1/(1 — 5)), then entry costs are prohibitive, the incentive
éumttìàM
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compatibility constraint is the one which is binding and, as already mentioned, from (1.12) 
we know that §£7 >  0. Lastly, if 0 <  K  < K u  then from Lemma 1, one has that Ta =  Tpcj 
and from (1.22) we know that <  0. M
So, even when potential entrants are threatened with a subsequent (temporary) cartel 
breakdown if entry takes place, strictly positive entry sunk costs must exist in order to 
discourage entry into the industry. In addition, if sunk entry costs are sufficiently high, 
then the optimal punishment length chosen by cartel members is increasing in the number 
of firms belonging to the collusive agreement.
1.3.3 Case 2. Accommodation
Rather than following the policy of reacting to entry by starting a finite punishment period, 
cartel members might decide to accommodate the entrant by achieving a new collusive 
outcome.21 If a potential entrant anticipates that, entering at period t, the N 1, active firms 
will adopt post-entry accommodation behavior, then the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for a triple (p*,X2, n* ) to constitute a free entry trigger strategy equilibrium are now given
by:
6(Vn+. - V - . ) > T l ' - ^ (1.26)
and,
(1.27)
21 Wenders (1971) calls this policy a “price maintenance strategy”.
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Whenever condition (1.26) holds, an individual active firm predicts that it will make 
more profit by being loyal to the cartel agreement than by being disloyal; therefore, the 
agreement is unlikely to breakdown because of an internal deviation.22
Condition (1.27) specifies that, even though incumbents will allow new competitors 
to join the collusive process, potential entrants anticipate a negative post-entry profit, which 
means that “Out” is an optimal choice for them.23
As in the previous section, we can now derive the optimal punishment length in a 
context where entering firms are accommodated by incumbents in a more inclusive agree­
ment.
■1»
Proposition 3 Let T * be as in Proposition 1. In a scenario in which incumbent firms re­
spond to entry by accommodating the new entrants, and assuming 
(n*/(n* +  1)) (S (1 -  a )  /  (1 -  6 (1 -  a )))  <  K  <  (n '/ (n *  +  1)) (5/(1 -  6)), the op­
timal punishment length f 2 is given by f 2 =  max { T 't Tpcj}, where
rn 1 , Ar(n- +  l ) ( l - 5 ( l - Q) ) - 5 I P ( l - a )
*** ln5 KSa(n' + 1)
Proof. From Proposition 1, we know that the incentive compatibility constraint (1.26) 
holds if and only if T  > T*f where T* is defined by eq. (1.11). Now, from (1.5) one can
22 It should be noted that although incumbent firms follow a policy of post-entry accommodation, we are 
still assuming that internal defection is followed by a finite period of cartel breakdown. Hence, conditions 
(1.17) and (1.26) coincide.
23 Again, both p * and X2 are chosen (by the cartel) to maximize the discounted profits, but now subject to 
constraints (1.26) and (1.27).
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easily conclude that
^  l - ( l - a U - a < 5 1+T" (1 a ) n* +  l
n*
( l - a )
(1.28)
Substituting now (1.28) into eq. (1.27), some algebra shows that condition (1.27) is satisfied 
if and only if:
1+ r, ^  K (n '  +  1) (1 -  (1 -  a ) 8) -  6 (1 -  a) II*
K  (n* +  1) a (1.29)
where we have to assume two restrictions regarding values which the entry sunk cost can 
take. First, we assume that K  > m order for the r.h.s. of eq. (1.29) to be
positive. Second, we suppose K  <  (—j)  to rule out the case in which the r.h.s. of
eq. (1.29) is greater than or equal to one and, therefore, the previous condition is trivially 
satisfied. Now, since the l.h.s. of eq. (1.29) is easily seen to decrease in T", some algebra 
shows that condition (1.29) (and, hence, (1.27)) holds if and only if:
r  a b * <"■+» s - ƒ P : ”» -«El1 - s i  ,  !•„. (,.30)
In 6 Koa (n* + 1 )
Hence, the minimum length o f the punishment period for which both the incentive 
and the participation constraints (eqs. (1.26) and (1.27)) hold is given by
7*2 =  max{r*,Tpc2}. ■
Notice that now, contrary to what has been found for the cartel breakdown scenario, 
in order for Tpc2 to exist, the entry (sunk) cost has to be sufficiently high (and not only 
positive).
As in Case 1, the analysis will now focus upon the sensitivity of the critical level for 
the punishment length for which the participation constraint (1.27) holds, Tpc2, to changes 
in the number of firms in the agreement or in the level of the entry cost. Making use of
inum imi '1 W ft Wf. w ^  II ; ^  g; wpt g g g H ü p.  K w R ^
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(1.30), it is straightforward to show that:24
d T p c2  _ _______________ IP (1 -  a )________________ 6 _
d n • ~  (n* +  1) (K (n’ +  1) (1 — ¿>(1 -  a)) — OT* (1 — a)) In i  <  U’ (1.31)
and
9T,c2 ________________n* (1 -  q)_________________ 6_
d K  K { K (n * +  1) (1 -  6(1  -  o )) -  <511* (1 -  a)))ln<5 (1.32)
Hence, as in Case 1, the higher the values of n* and 7f, the lower the minimal length 
of the punishment period which is compatible with an anticipated unprofitable entry. A s 
before, one can now show that, since Tpc2 is decreasing in i f ,  for sufficiently high levels 
of the entry sunk cost, condition (1.27) is a non-binding constraint. The next Lemma 
formalizes this result.
Lem m a 2 Let T2> T* and Tpc2 be as in Proposition 3. T2 = T* if and only if K  > i f 2,
where
K 2 IP  <5(1-a r c» )  n* +  1 1 — <5
Proof. From (1.11) and (1.30), some algebra shows that T* >  Tpc2 if and only if:
i f  a  (n* 4- 1) (n * — 1 — Sn* (1 — a))
(on* — 1) ( i f  (1 — (1 — a )  <5) (rc* +  1) — ¿IP  (1 — a)) 
which in turn implies that25
< 1, (1.33)
i f  >
IT  <5 (1 -  an*) =  
rc* + 1  1 — 5
(1.34)
Hence, if i f  > i f 2, T2 =  max {T*,Xpc2} =  T*.
24 Remember that, as was mentioned in the proof of Proposition 3, we assume that K  > 
Otherwise, there is no (finite) optimal punishment length compatible with cartel external stability.
25 Remember that a  <  1/n*.
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Corollary 2 Lei K 2 be as in Lemma 2. The optimal length of the punishment in an 
accommodation of the new entrants scenario, ¿ 2, increases with the number of firms if and 
only if K  >
Proof. If jFsT > K 2 , then applying Lemma 2, one has that T2 =  T"\ Then, from (1.12) 
we know that |£ r  >  0. If, instead, - ^  <  K  <  /C2, then by Proposition 3 and
Lemma 2, one has that T2 = Tjx2 and from (1.31) we know that <  0. Lastly, if  
K  <  1ig1(^ia)» ^  already mentioned in the proof of Proposition 3, the cartel is not
externally stable for any (finite) value of the punishment length. ■
t ;
. «
Before closing this section, let us compare the two critical levels for the entry cost 
derived in Lemma 1 and 2. Using (1.25) and (1.34), simple algebra shows that:
K 2 -  K i = - 77-7  (n* - 1 )  >  0. (1.35)n* + 1
This result stresses the fact that, for a given market structure (rc*), in order for the par­
ticipation constraint to be a non-binding constraint, the height of the entry barriers should 
be higher in the second case (accommodation of the new entrants) than in the first one (car­
tel breakdown). In other words, the existence of a pool of potential competitors is a more 
important constraint on the maintenance of a stable agreement when cartel members decide 
to accommodate the entrants. The intuition behind this result is just that the anticipation of 
a tougher price competition in Case 1 makes entry less attractive. This finding is particu-
larly relevant to us since, even though it is ex-ante optimal for cartel members to threaten 
entrants with a breaking up of the cartel if entry occurs,26 accommodating the new railroad
26 Notice, however, that we are not considering the possibility of "renegotiation” of equilibria. This is 
certainly an important further development of this study, since, as was stressed by Fudenberg and Tirole
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firms by allocating them market shares was considered by some authors as the incumbents’ 
best reply to entry during the operation of the JEC.* 27
1.3.4 Stability discussion
The purpose of this section is to pin down what are, in the extended version of the m odel, 
the theoretical predictions regarding the primary question addressed in the empirical p a rt 
of this chapter - understanding how entry o f new firms affects the firms* collusive pricing 
behavior.
Let Wt be the indicator function that takes value 1 if a price war occurs at period t .  
In addition, let P r (\Vt =  1) denote the stationary probability o f a price war occurrence in  
period t. In the next Proposition, the percentage of periods spent in a price war is derived 
and shown to be increasing in the punishment length.
Proposition 4 The percentage o f periods spent in a price war is given by
p'<H''-l>-TT S -
where P r  i}Vt =  1) increases with the length of the punishment phase T.
Proof. Within this framework, along the equilibrium path and whatever the assumed 
incumbents post-entry reaction, there is no cheating and/or entry of new firms. All price 
wars are induced by low demand shocks. The percentage of periods spent in a price war is
(1991), if “players have the opportunity to negotiate anew at the beginning o f each period, then equilibria that 
enforce good outcomes by the threat that deviations will trigger a punishment equilibrium may be suspect, as 
a player might deviate and then propose abandoning the punishment equilibrium for another equilibrium in  
which all players are better off.” (p. 175).
27 As will be explained in further detail in Section 1.4.
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just the stationary probability of being in a price war P r (Wt =  1). If there is a price war 
at period i — 1, then the probability that t — 1 was not the last period of the price war is 
given by (T — 1 )/T . P r( Wt =  1 | IVt_j =  1) =  (T — 1 )/T . If, instead, there is no price 
war at period t — 1, then the probability of a price war occurrence in the following period t 
is Pr(H /t =  1| Wt-1 =  0) — a . Therefore, the unconditional probability of being in a price 
war in period t is defined by
Pr (W, =  1) =  Pr (WU, =  1) +  Pr W - i  =  0) a. (1.36)
Now, since P r (Wt =  1) =  P r (Wt-1 =  1) as it is the stationary probability, one can rewrite 
eq. (1.36) as follows:
Pr (Wt = 1) =  Pr (Wt =  1) +  [1 -  Pr (Wt =  1)] a. (1.37)
Solving eq. (1.37) with respect to P r (Wt =  1), one obtains that:
PrW = 1) = TSr- (1-38)
Carrying out now a simple exercise of comparative statics using (1.38), it is straight­
forward to show that:
dPr(VKt =  1) a
dT  ~  (1 +  qT)2 '
(1-39)
This completes the proof. ■
The results of the previous sections suggest that in the case the number of cartel mem­
bers n* varies, there is a conflict between having collusion immune to internal defection, on 
the one hand, and to the entry of new competitors, on the other. In particular, eqs. (1.12), 
( 1.22) and (1.31) show that, whatever the incumbent’s post-entry reaction is, an increase 
in n* induces, on the one hand, an increase in the minimum length of the punishment T *
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for which the incentive compatibility constraint holds and a decrease in the critical thresh­
old for which the participation constraint is satisfied (Tpci* ^ 2)» on the other. Whether, in  
the end, this change in the number of firms leads to an increase or to a decrease of the o p ­
timal length o f the punishment phase {T\yT2) depends, as already shown, on the height o f  
the actual entry sunk costs. In particular, Corollary 1 and 2 have shown that the punish­
ment length increases with the number of firms if the actual level of the sunk entry cost is  
sufficiently high. If this is the case, then by Proposition 4 we also have that this increase 
in the optimal punishment length induced by an increase in the number of cartel m em bers, 
will in turn lead to an increase in the percentage of periods the cartel spends in a price-war. 
As will be shown in the empirical part of the chapter, this seems to have occurred during 
the operation o f the JEC cartel.
As a final remark, it should be stressed that as we are interested here in finding ou t 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for which the cartel is (internally and externally) 
stable, entry is, in this framework, treated as a disequilibrium phenomenon. Entry is never 
expected in equilibrium. When it occurs, the enlarged set of active firms coordinate on a  
new equilibrium taking for granted that entry will not occur any more and an anticompet­
itive conduct by the cartel members becomes more difficult to attain.28 This is im portant 
for the interpretation of the empirical results: since entry is actually observed during the  
period under study, this means that the data cannot be fully explained by the equilibrium 
model. It has to be explained with unexpected changes in exogenous variables such as a de­
crease in the sunk costs of entering the railway business (or to the arrival of a lone potential
28 That is, as entry occurs the cartel becomes (internally) less stable (see eq. (1.12)).
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entrant with a low cost of entry).29 Unfortunately, we do not have data on entry costs as­
sociated with the working of this specific cartel. But still, we can empirically test whether 
the new (accommodated) entrants contributed to an increase in the instability of the cartel 
agreement after entry has taken place. Specifically, an increase in cartel instability after en­
try can be justified, according to the theoretical model at hand, by a consequent adoption 
of longer (optimal) punishment periods once entry has occurred.
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1.4 The Joint Executive Committee
In this section we will briefly review the history of the Joint Executive Committee railroad 
cartel in the period between 1880 and 1886.30
The JEC was a public and legal agreement31 formed in April 1879, involving the 
railroads in the market. The aim of this cartel was to control the transport of grain, flour 
and provisions from Chicago to the East Coast. The colluding firms agreed upon a transport 
price structure and each member of the cartel was allocated a market share. Our attention
can be focused on the movements of grain without loss of generality, since the prices for 
transporting flour and provisions were very closely related to the grain rate.32
29 Notice, however, that the equilibrium in the original model could be slightly modified such that entry 
could be interpreted as an equilibrium phenomenon. Formally, assume that the entry sunk cost is K  most of 
the time, but it gets small enough to allow entry with small probability. If the probability of entry is very small, 
then it does not affect the continuation payoff of the incumbent firms (hence, their incentive constraints) very 
much. If the equilibrium of the original model is slightly modified so that the incentive constraints of the 
incumbent firms hold strictly (i.e. incumbent firms prefer the collusive price stricdy to secret price cutting), 
then it will be still an equilibrium which allows entry to occur with positive but small probability.
30 A more detailed analysis o f the history of the JEC cartel can be found in MacAvoy (1965).
31 Note that this cartel took place before the Sherman Act (1890).
32 With respect to this, MacAvoy (1965) pointed out that “it was not possible to isolate grain rates from the 
rest so that grain agreements could have been broken while agreements on provision and merchandise rates 
were not.” (p. 71).
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Two sources of arguments have led us to consider that it is reasonable to accept th a t 
the Green and Porter (1984) model fits this specific case. First, prices set by cartel m em bers 
were not perfectly observable by its rivals.33 Moreover, variability of aggregate demand w a s  
not only related to prices charged by cartel participants but also to some “unpredictable 
stochastic forces”.34
Entry occurred twice during the sample period we cover in this article. However, 
Porter (1983b) states that “bankrupt railroads were relieved by the courts of most of th e ir  
fixed costs and instructed to cut prices to increase business”(p. 303). This fact led som e 
authors to defend the position that because of the existence o f this “no-exit constraint” , 
the incumbent firms’ best response to entry was to accommodate entrants, allocating them  
market shares. Our claim here is that even though entry can lead the incumbent firms to  
an accommodation strategic behavior, the greater the number of firms in the agreement, 
the higher will be the probability of future price wars. In other words, we are interested in  
testing how entry may affect cartel stability.
1.5 The data
In this section we describe the data used in the econometric model. We deal here w ith 
weekly time-series data which was gathered and disseminated to member firms by the JEC .
The data available corresponds to the period which starts at the first week of 1880 and  
finishes on week 16 in 1886. Within the 328 sample points, five different periods related
33 In this direction, Hajivassiliou (1997, p. 6) remarks that “special shipping rates were sometimes secretly 
arranged with selected costumers”.
34 Porter (1985, p. 420).
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Variable Description
GR Grain rate; in dollars per 100 lbs.
TQG Total quantity of grain shipped (in tons).
Lakes Dummy variable; =1 if Great Lakes were open to navigation.
PW Cheating dummy variable; =1 when cheating was reported to 
have occurred.
N Number of firms in the cartel.
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1. List of Variables
to changes in the cartel composition can be distinguished. During the first 27 weeks there 
were 3 firms in the cartel: the New York Central, the Penn and the Baltimore and Ohio. 
The Grand Trunk Railway entered the cartel in week 28 of 1880. In week 11 of 1883 the 
New York Central added another line to its network. A fifth firm - the Chicago and Atlantic 
- entered the cartel in week 26 of 1883. Finally, in week 12 of 1886 this last entrant decided 
to leave the cartel due to a dispute with a non-JEC railroad (the Erie). A list of variables 
which will be used in the econometric models is presented in Table 1.
The price variable, GR, is the weekly reported price of grain (in dollars per lbs). This
is an index provided by the JEC after pooling all the member firms. The quantity variable,
TQG, is the aggregate tonnage of grain which was shipped by the JEC members in each of
the weeks included in the sample period. The Lakes variable is a dummy variable which
takes the value one whenever the Great Lakes were open to navigation and steamers could,
therefore, compete with the railroads.35 PW is the “cheating” dummy, and equals one when
cheating was reported to have occurred in the Railway Review and is used as a proxy of
cartel breakdowns. The original dataset developed by Porter (1983b) is here expanded to
include also the number of firms in the agreement in each period of time, variable N. This
35 Briggs (1996) considers lake steamers as another type of entrant which competed with the carte! for traffic. 
We do not follow his position. Instead, we consider lake traffic as alternative transportation services through 
the Great Lakes to ports along the Lake Erie, while the JEC cartel was operating.
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: ; ’ t
nummi ii mann
1.5 The data 36
Variable M ean
S tandard
Deviation
Minimum
Value
Maximum
Value
GR .2465 .0665 .125 .4
TQG 25384.4 11632.77 4810 76407
Lakes .5732 .4954 0 1
PW .3811 .4864 0 1
N 4.3506 .6273 3 5
2. Summary Statistics
new variable will allow us to control for structural changes in the cartel composition due to 
entry of new firms or departures from the JEC.
Table 2 presents some summary statistics of the variables.
Remember that one of the main arguments of the theoretical model presented in sec­
tions 2 and 3 is that a (tacit) agreement may be more difficult to reach and sustain when 
the number of firms in the cartel is larger. Using the information provided by variable PW, 
we constructed some descriptive statistics about the proportion of weeks during which the 
member firms colluded, controlling for the number o f firms in the agreement.
Table 3 presents these results and can be seen as a first empirical approach to the 
main problem we want to address in this chapter.36
36 Using the same data set, Briggs (1996) presents a similar table. However, he does not take into account 
the fact that from week 12 of 1886 on there were only four firms in the cartel, because of the departure of the 
Chicago and Atlantic.
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t \l :r;i:.
Number of Firms Number o f Weeks Collusive Periods (% )
3 27 100%
4 159 72,33 %
5 142 42,96 %
3. Proportion of Collusive Periods and Cartel Compositon
Note that when only the initial three firms composed the cartel, collusion was sus­
tained during all the first twenty-seven weeks of the sample. However, when four and five 
firms were in the cartel, collusion was successfully sustained for only 72% and 43% of the 
correspondent periods, respectively. Therefore, these results, although based on very sim­
ple descriptive statistics, reveal that it is reasonable to admit that the entry o f additional 
firms to the cartel aifected its profitability and stability.
1.6 The econometric model
In this section we will present a binary choice econometric model and discuss its results.
Binary choice models have been widely used in empirical applications to cross- 
section data. Nevertheless, there are also some time-series applications in which these 
tools can play a very important role. In this study we cover one of the latter cases since 
we are examining the economic decisions that cartel members had to make, in every single 
period of time, with regard to whether to cooperate or to begin a price war.
The use o f binary choice models relies on a strong assumption of independence across 
observations. In this particular model, we think that it is reasonable to assume that this is 
the case. Remember that the Green and Porter (1984) model is developed in a context of 
uncertainty about the level of demand and unobservability of rival’s actions. It defends that
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a price war is triggered whenever a firm observes an unusual drop in its demand. However, 
the probability o f a breakdown of the cartel agreement depends on a “signal-extraction 
problem”37 which is faced by each of the cartel participants. In addition, the model assumes 
that the realizations of demand are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over 
time. In those circumstances, each member firm cannot verify if the absence of demand 
was caused by a realization of a  low demand state or by a deviation of someone else in the 
agreement.
It is, therefore, clear that an equilibrium outcome in which the collusive price is 
charged forever is not sustainable. Price wars must occur in order for the collusive behavior 
to be sustained and, indeed, during the history of the JEC, attempts to achieve a price 
coordination met with phases of aggressive price competition.
The aim of the econometric model presented in this section is to identify the causes o f 
the price wars which occurred in the American railroad cartel during the nineteenth century. 
Namely, we test the importance o f entry effects on the collusive price scheme designed by 
the JEC.
Let us start by assuming that the probability of a price-war occurrence in period t 
(Pr (Wt ~  1)) can be explained according to the following logit model:
Prw  = 1) = rr7^> (1-40)
where t
%t — fii 4* fi%Nt 4- fizLakest- i  4* fi^TQGt^i * (1 ~  Wf_i) 4- 
where t =  2 ,..., 328 and e is an unobserved disturbance.
37 Erole (1988, p. 263).
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Equation (1.40) represents the (cumulative) logistic distribution function. It shows 
that P r (Wt =  1) is not only non-linear in the independent variables, but in the fi's as well. 
Therefore, we cannot use the OLS procedure to estimate the parameters. However, using 
(1.40) we have that,
P r W - 1) = e »  (141)
1 — Pr (Wt =  1) { ‘ }
Now, P r (Wt =  1) /  (1 — P r (Wt =  1)) is simply the odds ratio in favor of a cartel
breakdown. If we take the natural log of (1.41), we obtain:
“ 42)
For estimation purposes, we write (1.42) as follows:
L% ~  Pi H" ¡32 Nt +  (33Lake$t- i  +  P^TQGt-i * (1 — W t-i) +
Notice that Lu the log of the odds ratio, is not only linear in the independent variables, 
but linear in the parameters also. The Maximum-likelihood estimation results of this model 
are reported in Table 438 and the interpretation of the values presented in the odds ratio 
column is as follows: measures how the log-odds in favor of a cartel breakdown changes
as the independent variable associated with changes by one unit, controlling for all other 
predictors in the model.
We will start with a brief comment about the goodness of fit of the model. First of 
all, it should be stressed that models with discrete dependent variable are never constructed 
with the aim of maximizing goodness of fit, but we would like to say a few words about 
it. Moreover, note that analyzing the Likelihood Ratio Index39 may be misleading, since
38 Standard errors are reported in parentheses withp < 0.1 —* andp <  0.01 = ’ "  .
39 L R I  =  1 — where In Lq is the log-likelihood computed with only one constant.
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Independent
Variable
Odds Ratio
N t 4.298” *
(1.594)
Lakest^ i 0.460*
(0.195)
0.805” *
(0.019)
N. Obs. 327
Prob >  Chi2 0.000
Log Likelihood -91.457
Pseudo R2 0.58
4. Estimation Results
on the one hand values between 0 and 1 have no natural interpretation and, on the other, 
an L R I  =  1 may be indicative of a flaw in the model. For all these reasons, we should  
focus our attention on the x2 test on the significance of the parameters. Following this lin e  
of reasoning, Table 4 shows that the (null) hypothesis that all the independent variables’ 
coefficients are zero is strongly rejected. Hence, the model at hand can be considered to b e  
statistically significant.
Turning to the interpretation of the findings, it should be noticed first that the variable 
Lakest-i is the regressor with less explanatory power. Its estimated coefficient indicates 
that price wars were less likely to occur when Great Lakes were open to navigation.
We have also included the variable TQGt_i * (1 — Wt_a) to capture the effect o f  a  
negative shock in the previous period aggregate quantity, provided that period t — 1 was a  
collusive period. It turns out that, as predicted by the theoretical model under consideration, 
price wars were more likely to occur the smaller the aggregate quantity sold in the la st 
(collusive) period. This result goes in the direction of the predictions of the theoretical 
model we are considering here. Remember that, along the equilibrium path, a price w ar
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can only be triggered by a realization of a “low-demand state” in the previous (collusive) 
period, which is exactly the causal effect we intend to measure with this last variable.
Lastly, and most importantly, in the case of variable Nu as predicted by Stigler 
(1964), our results confirm that the greater the number of firms in the cartel, the more dif­
ficult it is to support a collusive outcome, that is, the likelihood of a price war occurrence 
increases as the number of cartel members increases. Two different forces justify this re­
sult. On the one hand, as the number of firms in the cartel increases, the higher the one-shot 
incentives to cheat on the collusive agreement are. Second, it appears that the equilibrium 
length of the punishment was made longer when there were more firms in the agreement. 
This evidence seems, therefore, to suggest that the actual entry sunk cost during the op­
eration of the JEC was not high enough to discourage new competitors from entering the 
market. However, this actual sunk cost of entry seems to be at the same time sufficiently 
high so that after entry has taken place, the enlarged set of active firms coordinated on a 
new equilibrium from that point onwards, adopting a longer (optimal) punishment length 
and taking for granted that entry would not occur any more (see Corollary 2). As a result, 
the proportion of periods spent in price-wars once more firms joined the cartel was higher, 
as shown by the estimation results.
To summarize, the results support the conjectures of the extended version of the 
Green and Porter (1984) model presented above. In particular, it reveals that the greater 
the number of firms belonging to the cartel agreement, the less likely it was that firms 
would succeed in co-ordinating their pricing behavior; thus entry played an important role 
as a determinant of the likelihood of a cartel breakdown.
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1.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have defined which conditions should be met in order for cartel members 
to maintain a non-trivial degree o f market power in a context of imperfect observability o f  
rivals* behavior and when there existed the threat of entry of new firms. To this end, w e  
have developed an extended version of the Green and Porter (1984) model in which en try  
is modeled explicitly. In particular, the model considers the cases where incumbent firm s 
can respond to entry either by adopting a perfectly competitive behavior for a while or b y  
accommodating the new firms. The model suggests that entry barriers are necessary for a n  
oligopoly with some degree of collusion to prevail. It also shows that even when strictly 
positive entry barriers exist, the existence of a pool of competitors is a more im portant 
constraint on the maintenance of a stable agreement when a potential entrant expects th a t 
incumbents will allow him to jo in  the (tacit) agreement.
A natural extension of the model we develop in this chapter would examine cases in  
which the firms have the opportunity to negotiate anew at the beginning of each period o f  
the infinite horizon game. For the purposes of this study, however, models of this sort a re  
classified as the subject of future research.
In the empirical part of this chapter, we focus on time-series data on the Joint E xec­
utive Committee to test key theoretical predictions about collusive behavior using m odels 
of discrete dependent variable. Specifically, assuming a context of demand uncertainty, w e  
analyze the determinants of the probability with which a price war occurs.
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We have found that the empirical results are consistent with our reexamined theoret­
ical model’s prediction that the number of firms in the industry plays an important role as 
a determinant of cartel instability.
Chapter 2
Tacit Collusion, Cost Asymmetries and
Mergers
2.1 Introduction
It has long been recognized that “ ...the more cost functions differ from firm to firm, th e  
more trouble the firms will have maintaining a common price policy, and the less likely jo in t  
maximization o f profits will be”(Scherer (1980), p. 205). Unfortunately, however, most o f  
the studies which have discussed the factors that facilitate or hinder tacit collusion h av e  
only examined the not very realistic case in which firms are perfectly symmetric in te rm s 
of their costs. The present study investigates how asymmetry in cost functions across firm s 
affects the scope for collusion and provides conditions under which a collusive outcom e 
involving all firms in the market can be supported.
We employ a model in which cost asymmetric firms repeatedly set quantities and u se  
optimal penal codes to enforce collusion. Asymmetry will be dealt with by assuming th a t  
firms have a different share of a specific asset (say, capital) which affects marginal costs . 
Therefore, a firm is considered “large” if  it owns a large fraction of the capital stock, a n d  
“small” if it owns only a restricted proportion of the capital available in the industry.
We start by characterizing firms’ incentives to deviate from the collusive phase a s  
well as their incentives to deviate from the punishment scheme. We show that these incen­
tives turn out to crucially depend on the asset holdings of the firms in the industry. Specifi-
44
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cally, joint profit maximization implies that output is shifted away from small (inefficient) 
firms towards large (efficient) firms. This implies that the smallest firm in the industry is 
the one that has the highest potential to steal the business of its rivals and, hence, has the 
highest incentives to disrupt the collusive agreement. This study thus provides a theoretical 
rational to the finding of Mason, Phillips and Nowell (1992) that, in experimental duopoly 
games, “low-cost agents are unable to induce high cost agents to collude” (pp. 665-666). 
In addition, it is also shown that the incentives to deviate are exactly reversed when the 
equilibrium calls for punishments. Following Abreu (1986, 1988), we assume that if a de­
viation occurs, all firms expand output for one period so as to drive price below cost and 
return to the most collusive sustainable output in the following periods, provided that every 
player went along with the first phase of the punishment. Since the largest firm is the one 
that proportionally loses most in the first period of the punishment, it will have the highest 
incentive to deviate from the punishment strategy.
We then identify a minimal threshold for the discount factor in order for collusion 
to be sustained and study the impact of changes in firms* asset holdings on this minimal 
threshold. In spite of the simplifying assumptions (namely, the particular demand and cost 
functions used), the results offer some interesting merger policy implications. Specifically, 
they allow us to discuss the issue of joint or oligopolistic dominance which has been gain­
ing increasing importance in European merger control.40 The analysis suggests that the 
evaluation of whether the structural change implied by a merger creates more favorable
40 The issue of joint dominance was first used by the European Commission in the Nestle/Perrier case. 
However, only in more recent cases, such as the Kali und Salz case and the Airtours/First Choice case, it 
has become clear that this concept can be used to block mergers within the European merger control. For a 
detailed analysis on this see Motta (2000).
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conditions for tacit collusion to arise between the remaining firms, depends on which firm s 
the merger involves. In particular, it is shown that two different effects can be induced by a  
m erger (i) if firms were already colluding before the merger takes place, then the m erger 
will only have effects on the scope for collusion if it affects the size of the largest firm in  
the industry. A merger increasing the size of the largest firm gives rise to a more asymmet­
ric distribution of assets and this offsets the increased risk of anticompetitive behavior due 
to higher concentration; {%%) If, instead, firms were not colluding before the merger, then a  
merger might make collusion enforceable afterwards. This will occur when the merger in ­
volves very small (and, hence, inefficient) firms, which, as already mentioned, turn out to  
have very high incentives to disrupt the collusive agreement.
To the best of our knowledge, the only paper that discusses the impact of cost he t­
erogeneity on the stability of tacit collusion is Rothschild (1999). In a repeated game set­
ting, Rothschild shows that the stability of tacit collusion depends crucially, and in quite 
a complex way, on the relative efficiencies of the deviant and nondeviant firms. There ex­
ist, however, two major differences between Rothschild’s framework and the setting used 
in this chapter. First, while Rothschild assumes that firms adopt standard ‘grim’ trigger 
strategies, in this model firms’ strategies incorporate optimal punishments with a stick and 
carrot structure in the style of Abreu (1986,1988) to sustain a mutually desirable collusive 
outcome.41 Specifically, Abreu’s work is extended to consider a class of “proportional pe­
nal codes” .42 Second, in this study costs are not exogenous but depend on assets, that is, on
41 As Vives (2000) observes, “in general, the threat of Nash reversion does not provide the most severe 
credible punishment to deviants to a collusive agreement. This fact is important because the more severe the 
punishment is, the more ‘cooperative’ outcomes can be sustained.” (p. 311).
42 In this particular class of penal codes, firms outputs along the punishment path are proportional to their
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each firm’s share in the industry capital. This fact allows for the discussion of the impact 
of transfer of asset holdings amongst firms on their incentives to collude.
In two recent papers, which are probably the closest to our study, Compte, Jenny 
and Rey (1997) and, more recently, Kuhn and Motta (1999), working respectively with a 
Bertrand supergame with asymmetric capacity constraints and with a differentiated goods 
framework where firms produce different numbers of products, discuss the joint dominance 
issue based on asset transfers. Both studies reach - despite different mechanisms at work - 
the same conclusion that a more symmetric industrial structure enhances collusion. How­
ever, while in Compte, Jenny and Rey (1997) firms are endowed with different capacities 
and it turns out that the largest firm (the one with the highest capacity) is the one that has 
the highest incentive to disrupt the collusive agreement, in Kuhn and Motta (1999) firms’ 
assets are product varieties, and the firm which tends to have the largest incentive to de­
viate is the one with the most limited range of products (the smallest one in the industry). 
For that reason, Kuhn and Motta (1999) conclude that “the specific incentive structure for 
collusion for small and large firms may vary greatly depending on the type of asset one is 
concerned about” (p. 2). In the present study, as already mentioned, firms own some share 
of an industry tangible asset (capital) which affects marginal costs. In line with the two pre­
vious works, the outcome which emerges is that a more asymmetric distribution of firms* 
asset holdings tends to hurt tacit collusion. Nevertheless, it also appears that the smallest 
firms constitute the main obstacle for the stability of the collusive agreements. Hence, al­
though the asset under consideration implicitly captures the importance of firms’ capacity,
share in the industry capital.
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as in Compte, Jenny and Rey (1997), the results obtained regarding the mapping between 
firm’s asset holdings and their incentives to collude are much closer to those obtained b y  
Kuhn and Motta (1999). In addition, new insights are drawn for practical application o f  
competition policy.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The model is laid out in the next 
section. In section 3, the case of perfect efficient collusion is considered. In this section, 
firms are assumed to maximize joint profits during the collusive phases. Section 4, d is­
cusses the case of perfect non-efficient collusion, i.e., firms are assumed to coordinate o n  
the jointly production of the monopoly (aggregate) quantity, but deviate away from the jo in t 
profit maximization rule to try and enhance collusion sustainability. This section, therefore, 
discusses the trade-off that exists between efficiency (joint-profit maximization) and sus­
tainability in an industry-wide cartel of the type presented in this chapter. Finally, section 
5 offers some concluding comments.
2.2 The model
Consider n  firms which produce in the same market for infinitely many periods. Suppose 
they make output decisions simultaneously at the beginning of each period. Let be the 
quantity chosen by firm i, i 6  {1,..., n}, in period t, t  =  1, 2, . . . .
We assume that the industry inverse demand is piecewise linear:
p  (Q ) =  max {0, a -  bQ}  , (2.43)
y i i
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where Q 6  [0, n | ]  is the industry output, p is the price of the output and a, b > 0 are 
demand parameters.
Following Perry and Porter (1985), we assume that what distinguishes firms is the 
amount of capital they own. Total supply of capital is assumed to be fixed to the industry. 
For the sake of simplicity, the total quantity of capital is normalized to be one.43 Let k{ be 
the fraction of the industry capital stock owned by firm it i 6  {1, Notice that the 
assumption of a fixed supply of the industry capita] is a key feature of the model which will 
affect our discussion of the effects of changes on firms’ size (as measured by hi) and in the 
number of firms on the scope for collusion.
The cost function of a firm that owns a fraction h  of the capital stock and produces 
units of output is given by:
Ci(qi,k i) = cqi + -£ ., (2.44)
n
where 0 < c <  a ,44 0 <  <  1 and £  =  1* Without loss of generality, we assume that
i= 1
ki >  ... >  knf5 qi €  [0, j]  and fixed costs are taken to be zero.
The resulting marginal cost function is linearly increasing:
C'i(qi,k i) ~ c + ^ .  (2.45)
Notice that the marginal cost function rotates about the intercept as the proportion 
of capital owned by firm i (ki) increases or decreases. Hence, this way of characterizing 
efficiency differences amongst firms implicitly captures the importance of firms’ capacity46
43 As pointed out by Perry and Porter (1985), “this supresses de novo entry into the industry” (p. 220).
44 To exclude the trivial case in which production is not viable.
45 Firms are ranked by decreasing efficiency.
46 If a firm is endowed with a small share of the industry capital, it will face a rapidly rising marginal cost
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Assume that in the absence o f  collusion, firms behave like Cournot competitors. A  
basic insight from the supergame literature is that nonstationary equilibria of quantity s e t­
ting oligopoly repeated games are much larger sets than just the Cournot (Nash) equilib­
rium repeated in every round. Reductions in output below the Cournot levels can benefit 
all the players, but they also create incentives for some firms to undermine the tacitly c o l­
lusive agreement by (secretly) expanding their individual output. Hence, in order for ta c i t  
collusion to be possible, firms have to use their ability to punish each other’s deviations 
from any supposed equilibrium path, by using a credible penal code. A penal code is  a  
rule which specifies what players should do in the event that a firm deviates either from th e  
collusive path or from the behavior specified in the penal code. If a penal code is credi­
ble, then, in each period of the game, given that all the other firms have decided to fo llow  
the behavior prescribed by the penal code, each individual player maximizes the p resent 
value of its profits stream by also obeying the penal code. Subgame perfection is here u sed  
as the equilibrium concept. Unfortunately, as has been shown by different versions of th e  
Folk Theorem ,47 there exists a large set of subgame perfect equilibrium strategies, if p lay ­
ers are sufficiently patient. However, in order to carry out comparative statics exercises, 
which turn out to be particularly relevant to analyze the effects of mergers (and other c a p ­
ital transfers) on the scope for collusion, a plausible equilibrium will, in what follows, b e  
selected and characterized within the set of subgame perfect equilibria.
A standard example of a credible penal code is the one proposed by Friedman (1971), 
which consists in a Coumot-Nash reversal forever. This penal code is easily seen to b e
curve.
47 See, for example, Fudenberg and Maskin (1986).
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credible since no player can gain by deviating in the punishment phase, because play there 
is just an infinite number of repetitions of a static (Nash) equilibrium. Notice, however, 
that such an infinite unforgiving punishment might seem rather extreme. This fact justifies 
the importance of two papers by Abreu (1986,1988). In order to derive the highest level of 
profits which can be sustained by a fixed number of firms as a subgame perfect equilibrium, 
Abreu examined a class of more sophisticated punishments than reversion to the one-shot 
Nash equilibrium. He pointed out that, without loss of generality, attention can be restricted 
to what he defined as simple penal code. A simple penal code has a very simple structure. 
If firms conform with the strategies of the prescribed equilibrium, then they will earn the 
value of the best continuation equilibrium. If, instead, a single deviation occurs,48 all firms 
(including the deviant one) revert to a punishment which gives the deviant its worst possible 
continuation equilibrium.49 Assume that period t payoffs are received at the end of period 
t. For each simple penal code, there exists a vector ( i > i , . w h e r e  vt represents the 
present value of profits that firm i 6 ( 1 , n} receives after its deviation has occurred, 
discounted to the beginning of the first period after deviation.
Let qc represent a collusive output vector. Denote the profit corresponding to firm i 
under collusion as 7rf (ki) and the (one period) gain from deviation as 7if (fc*). The collusive 
output is said to be sustainable if, for some simple penal code and for all i, the potential 
short-run gains from cheating are no greater than the present value of expected future losses
48 Simultaneous deviations are ignored since in seeking a Nash or subgame-perfect equilibria, we ask only 
if a player can gain by deviating assuming his opponents play as originally specified.
49 In other words, the most effective way to prevent a player from deviating is to threaten to respond to 
a deviation from a proposed strategy by playing the subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated 
game which yields the lowest payoff of all such equilibria for the deviator.
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which are due to the subsequent punishment. This trade-off is captured by the analysis o f  
the incentive compatibility constraint:
where 6 €  (0 ,1 ) is the common discount factor. If the condition in (2.46) (or, equivalently, 
(2.47)) holds for all i, then the collusive solution is self-enforcing for every single firm in  
the coalition.
In the analysis which follows, we consider the case of perfect efficient collusion. 
The analysis suggests that the extent to which an industry can sustain a stable collusive 
agreement depends crucially upon the asset distribution amongst coalition members. In  
particular, it is shown that small firms represent the main obstacle for industry-wide collu­
sion.
2.3 The analysis o f perfect efficient collusion
In this section, the case in which firms are assumed to adopt a joint profit maximization 
behavior on the collusive path is analyzed, concentrating particularly on understanding 
the effect o f  the structure of asset distribution amongst member firms on the scope fo r 
collusion. To do so, we start by computing the collusive and the optimal deviation profits 
for a generic firm i, owning a fraction ki of the industry capital stock.
(2.46)
which can also be written as follows:
(2.47)
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2,3.1 Collusive profits
In the specific case of full collusion, the coalition operates as a monopolist with n plants, 
so the marginal cost of production (me) must be equalized amongst firms:50
me =  c +  ~  =  c +  “ 8 = ...«  c -f  (2.48)
Using relation (2.48),51 we can easily derive the ‘aggregate* marginal cost of pro­
duction (m e (Q)) by horizontally summing the individual marginal cost functions of the 
member firms:
mc(Q) =  c +  Q. (2.49)
Hence, it is straightforward to show that the collusive aggregate quantity, individual 
output and market price are, respectively:
_  a — c 
Q ~  26 +  1’
(2.50)
- a — c 
«‘ =  2 6 + 1 * ’
(2.51)
and
. a +  b(a + c) 
P ~  2 6 + 1  •
(2.52)
From the above expressions for the equilibrium price and individual quantity, it fol-
lows that the profit earned by firm i in a collusive period equals:
^ - 5 (2 6 + 1 fc’ > a
(2.53)
50 As opposed to models in which firms have different but constant marginal costs, the cartel problem at 
hand is not a trivial one.
51 Notice that Vi € {1, —, n ) , ft =  (me — c) hi.
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At this stage, it is worth mentioning that the allocation rule adopted by the cartel in 
order to share the joint profit maximizing output (as expressed by eq. (2.48)) reflects the 
firms’ different sizes (as shown by eq. (2.51)). Since, as output increases, marginal cost 
rises more rapidly for a small firm than for a large firm, joint profit maximization implies 
that the smaller (and, hence, the more inefficient) a member firm is, the lower its share 
in the aggregate output is. Banning side payments, this implies a correspondingly smaller 
share in the joint profit (see eq.(2.53)).
2.3.2 Deviation profits
If firm i considers deviating from the collusive agreement, it assumes that all the opponents 
will keep their quantities constant at the collusive level in the current period. Hence, it takes 
as given the combined rival’s (collusive) output and chooses its deviation quantity (gf) by  
maximizing the following profit function:
/  \
(?!)•••) Qn'i ki) a - b q i - b ^ q j
3=1 ,
V &  /
q i - c q i - (2-54)
Making use of equation (2.51), one finds that ^  qt = (1 — hi). Therefore,
j=i
(2.54) can be rewritten as follows:
* f  (<?•; *0  =  ( a - b g . - b  (1 -  * , ) )  «  -  cqt -  &  (2.55)
By maximizing (2.55) with respect to qit it turns out that firm i's  optimal deviation 
quantity equals,
d _  (a -  c) (1 +  b +  bki)
9i ~  (26 +  1) (26Jfei +  l) (2.56)
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Using eq. (2.56) to substitute for qt in expression (2.55), one obtains:
-d (i.\ _  l ( a - c )2(1 + b + bk jf 
2 (26fcj + 1 ) ( 2 6 + 1)2 fc‘
(2.57)
Using now expressions (2.53) and (2.57) in order to carry out a simple exercise of 
comparative statics, it can be shown that >  ® an^ als° that —
| (a-c) >  0.52 Hence, the more efficient a member firm is, the
higher its share on the collusive profit, on the one hand, and the higher are its deviation 
profits, on the other.53
2.33  Distribution of assets and scope for collusion
Having defined the profits of a representative firm i both at the joint profit maximum and in 
a deviation scenario, respectively, we now turn to the study of the conditions which must be 
satisfied in order for a stable fully collusive outcome to exist This section will show how 
the incentives to deviate from the fully collusive agreement depend on the asset holdings of 
the firm, focusing on pure strategy (subgame) perfect equilibria. In particular, we propose 
a specific class of penal codes more severe than Coumot-Nash reversion, in the style of the 
ones which have been characterized in general by Abreu (1986,1988).
In his paper, Abreu (1988) shows that repeated games with discounting may be com­
pletely analyzed in terms of simple strategy profiles. A simple strategy profile is “a rule 
specifying an initial path (i.e., an infinite stream of one-period action profiles), and pun-
52 Remember that the total quantity of capital was assumed to be exogenously given and normalized to be 
one. Therefore, when performing exercises of comparative statics with respect to fc*, we are simply comparing 
the effect of interchanging a more efficient firm with a less efficient one.
53 As we will see below, this does not imply that the larger the firm, the higher its incentive to deviate from 
the collusive agreement.
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ishments (also paths, and hence infinite streams) for any deviations from the initial path 
or from  a previously prescribed punishment” (Abreu (1988), p. 383). More formally, as 
already mentioned, qijt denotes the quantity chosen by firm ¿, i € {1, ...,n} , in period ¿, 
¿ » 1 , 2 , . . . .  Let q(t) =  (gi,t ) qnf) . An action profile is referred to as a path o r
punishment and is denoted by P  € ffc, where Cl represents the set of paths.
Definition 1 (cf Abreu(1988)) Let P* € fi, i =  0,1, ...,n . A simple strategy profile 
S S P  (P ° , P 1, Pn) specifies: (z) play P° until some player deviates unilaterally from  
P°; (ii) for any j  €  { 1 , n} , play P j i f  the j —th player deviates unilaterally from P*, i = 
0 ,1 ,..., n, where P* is an ongoing previously specified path; continue with P l if no devia­
tions occur or i f  two or more players deviate simultaneously.
A simple strategy profile is therefore history-independent in the sense that it specifies the 
same punishment P* for any deviation (from the initial path P ° or from a previously pre­
scribed punishment) by player i. When there is an unilateral deviation, the subsequent 
sequence of action profiles depends on the identity of the deviant and not on the history 
that preceded its deviation.54 Now, a simple penal code is defined by an n-vector of pun­
ishments ( P 1, ..., P 71), where P* is inflicted if player i deviates. Notice that the elements 
of simple strategy profiles that define a simple penal code differ only with respect to the 
initial path they prescribe.
54 As was highlighted by Abreu (1988), “in no sense is there any need to ‘make the punishment fit the 
crime’." (p. 385).
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Necessary and sufficient conditions for perfect efficient collusion
The following Lemma shows that under the assumptions of our model, a simple pe­
nal code exists which is an optimal penal code. A penal code is said to be optimal if it 
yields to the deviant player the lowest possible continuation payoff in any (subgame) per­
fect equilibrium of the model at hand.
Lemma 1 An optimal simple penal code exists.
Proof. To prove that a simple penal code exists, all we need to show is that the model fits 
Assumptions 2 to 4 in Abieu (1988). Notice that:
1. (qi,..., qn) €  [0, f  ] ”, which is a compact topological space;
2. The one period profit function of a generic firm i, 7rf (<?i,..., qn\ ki) , is continuous.
3. Since the cost functions C^q^ki) are strictly convex in the first argument
> 0^ and the (inverse) demand function is piecewise linear, each firm’s 
profit function is strictly quasi-concave in its own output. Moreover, the profit 
functions are continuous and their domain is compact. Hence, the one-shot (stage) 
game has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (a Coumot equilibrium exists) and,35 
therefore, the set of perfect equilibrium strategy profiles o f the supergame with 
discounting is nonempty.
Hence, by Proposition 2 in Abreu (1988), an optimal simple penal code exists. ■
55 See Appendix A.
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Lemma 1 establishes the existence of an n —vector of punishments. The i — th  vec­
tor is an infinite stream of action profiles specifying what each player should do in the 
event of a (single) deviation by firm i from the agreed upon initial path, or from a previ­
ously prescribed punishment. In the case that player i’s specific punishment is imposed, 
this player will earn its lowest possible perfect equilibrium payoff. Notice, however, that 
this result does not provide us with the specific intertemporal structure of the optimal pun­
ishment paths. In what follows, we show that although asymmetry amongst firms* cost 
functions is assumed, the optimal punishments inflicted to deviant players may have very 
simple structures, as the following definition suggests.
Definition 2 u (q1,# 2) denotes a simple “proportional” two-phase penal code, where:
• 4  = (4i,-,4n) € [0 ,f]n , / o r j  =  l,2;
•  Qi=  =t=1
• 4  =  kiQ Jfori € =  1,2;
,  a. _  /  4 ,  if * =  1
\  9?, i f f  =  2 ,3 ,... •
Two remarks are in order at this point. First, notice that the proposed class of penal 
codes (proportional to capital shares) uses the same punishment path for every deviating 
firm. Second, this particular class of punishments has a two-phase structure, implying that 
punishments are stationary after the first period.
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Definition 3 (ql ,q2) =  8 (q1) +  ( ^ )  ir{ (g2)), where ^  (qj )ffori 6 {1, ...,n} , j  -
1,2, is the profit earned by firm i when g7 is the vector o f quantities produced by all firms. 
Abreu (1986) applies the systematic framework presented in Abreu (1988) to oligopolistic 
quantity-setting supergames. Our setting respects Assumptions (A2)-(A5) in Abreu (1986). 
However, instead o f identical firms producing a homogeneous good at constant marginal 
cost, we consider cost asymmetric firms whose efficiency differences are characterized by 
the cost function (2.44). The next Lemma aims at showing that, under the assumptions o f 
our model and if players are sufficiently patient, a “proportional” two-phase penal code ex­
ists, yielding every player a payoff of zero. Since zero is the minmax payoff for every firm 
in the component game, the proposed penal code turns out to be globally optimal.56
Lemma 2 There exists a lower bound 8 < 1 such that for every 8 > 8 there exists a 
pair (q: , q2) €  [0, g ]2n such that a (q1, q2) is an optimal simple “proportional” two-phase 
penal code yielding vt (g1, q2) =  0 for a lii € {1,..., n} if and only if 8 >8.
Proof. For any (q1, q2) G [0, | ] 2n, (q1, q2) =  0 if and only if:
-  n  (q1) =  <5 (g2) -  TTi (q1) ) . (2.58)
On the other hand, a ( q \q 2) is a perfect equilibrium if and only if no member firm has 
incentives to deviate from any phase of the punishment, that is, if and only if, for all i,
K  (9-i) -  Xi (91) <  S i*i (<72) -  (91) ) , (2.59)
■x’i ( ¿ j )  -  (9s) <  <5 (9s) -  n  (91) ) . (2.60)
56 Zero is the lowest possible payoff that firms are willing to accept in order to go along with the punishment, 
since firms can guarantee themselves a zero payoff by producing nothing forever.
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where = (gf, —,g<_i,gf+i, —, «j), j  = 1,2, andrrj : [0, f]""1 -> R denotes firm 
¿'5 best response profit, that is, ttJ ( ¿ 4) =  max g i4) |ar €  [0, f  ] } . Since a  (g1, q2) 
satisfies (2.58), eqs. (2.59) and (2.60) can be rewritten as follows, respectively:
<  ( ¿ i )  =  0, (2.61)
and,
K  (?!,) <  (g2) -  n  (g1) . (2.62)
Let D  =  {£ €  (0,1)| (tf,?1,? 2) satisfies Eqs. (2.58), (2.61) and (2.62) for some 
( g \  Q2) €  [0, ? ] - } .  Continuity of ^  (♦) and ?r4 (•) implies that D is closed.57 Since de­
mand is piecewise linear, p  (0) >  C '(0) (that is, a > c) and C- ($) >  0 (assumptions 
(A2)-(A4) in Abreu (1986) hold in our framework), there exists q° € [0, g]n and, there­
fore, a Q° =  9? such that p(Q° (1 — A*)) <  67/(0) =  c.58 Hence, by (A2) in Abreu
i=i
(1986) and since C.'■ (g*) >  0, one has that ^  (q°) <  0 and 7rJ (g^) =  0. Observe that 
there exists a proportional fully collusive output vector gc €  [0, f ] n, where gf is given by 
equation (2.51). L et£ ' =  ^ (^ -^ (q O ) <  L Then, (¿ \g 0,g c) satisfies Eqs. (2.58), (2.61) 
and (2.62), and D  is nonempty.59 Let 6 =  min D. Then, for 6 < 6 there exists no (<5, g1, g2) 
such that a  (g1, g2) is a Perfect Equilibrium and Vi (g1, g2) =  0. So, the “only i f ’ part of the 
proof is complete.
57 Notice that the condition 6 > 0 in the definition of D  is not binding/relevant When <5 =  0, condition 
(2.58) is not satisfied. As a consequence, continuity of tt* (•) and 7rt* (*) implies that min D exists (and is 
positive).
58 It is worth mentioning at this point that since in this setting <7/ (0) =  c, <5° can be chosen to fit all possible 
deviating firm i.
59 Notice that (2.60) is satisfied, since one can chose Q° to be high enough.
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Let (g1*,?2*) €  [0 ,f]2n satisfy Eqs. (2.58), (2.61) and (2.62) for 6 = 6. Now 
consider 6 >  6 and let q1 e  [0, f ] n satisfy Eq. (2.58) for q2 = q2* and 6 = 6. By (A2)-(A4) 
in Abreu (1986), q1 exists, -irt >  —tt* (q3*), and Q1 > Q1* >  <3°, so that (6,ql ,q2m)
The intuition behind this result is as follows. A potential deviant has to trade off 
the short-run gains from deviation with the future discounted loss due to the restarting of 
a punishment phase.60 Hence, the discount factor should be high enough for firms not to 
deviate from the punishment strategy. Besides, if 6 is higher, firms can increase the severity 
of the punishment by appropriately choosing a higher aggregate output in the first phase of 
the punishment scheme (Q1 in our notation). Therefore, there is some minimum discount 
factor, denoted such that it is credible to impose a punishment which yields each firm a 
zero payoff.
Lemma 2 simplifies the characterization of the relationship between asset distribution 
and firms' incentives to collude, considered in the next Proposition.
Proposition 1 Let 6 be as in Lemma 2. Perfect efficient collusion is sustainable in a 
subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if  6 >  max <5n j ,  where 6n =
60 Notice, in this direction, that, as pointed out by Abreu (1988), “the early stages of an optimal punishment 
must be more unpleasant than the remainder.”(p. 385) Therefore, the punishment is made credible by the 
threat of being restarted should any player deviate from the punishment strategy.
satisfies Eqs. (2.58), (2.61) and (2.62). Thus, o (q1, q2*^ j is a perfect equilibrium and yields
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Proof. Notice that the incentive compatibility constraint (eq. (2.46)) can be rewritten in  
the following way:
TTi (fci) -  (1 -  6) xt(ki) > ( l - t f )  Vi. (2.63)
By Lemma 2, for every 6 > £, an optimal “proportional* penal code exists yielding =
0, Vz €  { 1 , n}.  Hence, if  6 >£, the r.h.s. of condition (1.8) equals zero.
Now, making use of eqs. (2.53) and (2.57), one concludes that tt?(fc*)—(1 — £) (&») >
0, if and only if, for all i €  { l,...,n } :
(1 +  b +  bki)
Notice also that, from (2.64), it can be easily shown that,
§ . - * V - - < 0 .
dki (1 +  b +  bki)
(2.64)
Hence, the main problem is to prevent firms with rapidly rising marginal cost curves 
from deviating. Since in our setting kn denotes the share in the capital corresponding to the 
smallest firm in the industry, the condition which should be taken into account in order to  
evaluate the stability of an industry-wide cartel whose members maximize joint profits a t 
the collusive path is
S >  62(1 = 6 n. (2.65)
(1 +  b +  bfcn)2
Hence, i f  8 < ¿n, then perfect efficient collusion cannot be sustainable, since (2.65) 
is a necessary condition under maximal punishments. Take now the case in which 6n < 6. 
When this is the case, firms cannot enforce perfect efficient collusion when 6 <6. This is so 
because firms are assumed to use the most severe punishment strategies. These punishment 
strategies are optimal in the sense that given a certain fixed collusive allocation (namely,
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the one given by eq. (2.51)), firms can implement this same allocation with the lowest 
critical discount factor, 6. Thus, a perfect efficient collusion is sustainable if and only if 
6 > max J* ■
Proposition 1 captures the fact that, as already shown, joint profit maximization im­
plies that output is shifted away from small (inefficient) firms towards large (efficient) firms. 
As a result, the smallest firm is the one which is allotted a share in the collusive aggregate 
output that is too low with respect to its optimal deviation output. However, as was high­
lighted by Martin (1988), a small inefficient firm“may well judge that over the long run its 
bargaining power within the cartel will be tied to its market share. If this is the case, ac­
cepting a lower market share to maximize joint profit will amount to cutting its own throat 
within the cartel.” (p. 137). Notice, in this direction, that, from eqs. (2.51) and (2.56), it is 
straightforward to show that:
çf _ 1 b 4- bkj
~  2bk{ + 1
(2.66)
For a collusive agreement to be stable, this ratio should not be too high for any mem­
ber firm i. Working through some algebra, one can show that —- <  0.
Therefore, the smaller the firm is, the higher its potential to profitably capture demand 
from its opponents by deviating.61 It should also be stressed at this point that the fact that 
small firms are the less keen to accept the collusive agreement relies on our assumption of 
absence of monetary transfers, which we think is the most realistic in most circumstances.
61 At this point it is worth contrasting this result with the one obtained by Rothschild (1999). In his paper, 
Rothschild does not give sharp predictions as to the relationship between firms’ cost conditions and their 
ability to sustain a collusive agreement to restrict output. His Proposition 4 shows that the most inefficient 
firms might be the ones that determine the stability a fully collusive agreement. However, in his result the 
propensity of these firms to deviate depends crucially upon the Cournot outputs of the nondeviant firms, and 
this in turn depends on the relative efficiencies o f the deviant and nondeviant firms.
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The previous proposition also highlights the fact that in order for firms to credibly 
participate in this efficient collusive scheme, they should be willing to comply with the 
collusive path, on the one hand, and with the punishment strategy, on the other. It was 
shown that on the collusive equilibrium path the incentive constraint which is binding is 
that of the smallest firm. In the next proposition it is shown that if the smallest firm is not 
too small (inefficient), then we can also identify the firm for which the incentive constraint 
is binding on the punishment path.
Proposition 2 I f  the smallest firm in the industry is not too small, that is, if  kn 6  [fc*, JfcJ, 
where
k* 6s (fcj +  6&i + 1 )  +  2bk\ (1 +  46)
( i  -  t o 2 6s +
(26 + 1) ((26 + 1 ) -  (1 +  6fc, +  6) V'((26 +  l ) ( l  +  2Jfc16)))
( l - M * * *
then 6 >  6n>
Proof. From (2.58), one concludes that:
f  _  - n  (q1)
Ki(q2) - T i ( q 1)'
(2.67)
Since, in this setting, irt (q*) =  {o-~c-bQl)ktQi and rr, (ç2) =  (a -  c -  bQ2) kiQ'1— 
^'2*? ’ one can recv2'uate (2-67), obtaining
s = 0 i_________ (26 +  1) Q1 — 2 (o -  c)
(Q1 ~  Q2) ((Q1 + Q*) (26 + 1) -  2 (a -  c ))’ (2.68)
ft MU-L.... f— -
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where we assume that Q1 > 2 (^=^) in order for 6 to be positive. Now, from (2.68), one 
can easily show that:
Ô6 _  2 Q1 (Q1 (26 +  1) -  2 ( a -  c)) ((26 +  1) Q2 -  (a -  c)) 
9Q2 ~  (Q1 — Q2Ÿ  ((Q 2 +  Q1) (26 + 1 )  -  2 (a -  c))2
(2.69)
which is always non-negative for the following two reasons. First, we have just assumed 
that Q1 >  2 (~ ^ -)  in order for 6 to be positive. Second, forali i =  {1, ...,n} , the individual 
profit function is strictly concave in its own output and the joint profit maximum is achieved 
when the aggregate output equals (see eq. (2.50)). Hence, Q2 >  Since we are
looking for a minimum value for the discount factor <5, let us, therefore, set Q2 = .
Reevaluating (2.68) for this specific value of Q2, one gets
$• =
Q1 (26 +  1) ((26 +  l)<?1 - 2 ( q -  c))
((‘2b + l ) Q i - ( a - c ) ) i 
Notice now that, from (2.70), it can be easily shown that
(2.70)
dSm 2 (2b +  1) (o — c f
> 0 . (2.71)
dQ1 ( ( 2 b + l ) Q '- ( a - c ) f  
Hence, in order to minimize 6*, we want the lowest possible value of Q1 for which 
conditions (2.61) and (2.62) hold. Notice that, as long as Q 1 <  §,
?rt* (gl*) =  § (a — c — bQl (1 — ki))2 2 ^  ,62 Hence, in order for condition (2.61) to hold,1+2 bki
we must have that Q1 >  Let us, therefore, set Q1 =  Now, using the
analytical expressions of ir4 (q1) and tt* (q2) specified above and given that irj (q i{) =  
|  (a — c — bQ2 (1 — ki))2 —^ - , some algebra shows that when we set Q1 =  and
62 In the case that Q l >  f  ,*7 (? - ,)  = 0  and. therefore, condition (2.61) is trivially satisfied.
63 Notice that Vfci €  (0 ,1 ), ^ } >  2 and, therefore, 6* is nonnegative.
I
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Q2 =  condition (2.62) is satisfied if, for all z,
64 (1 -  fci)2 ( l  +  kf)-(2b + l ) 2 (1 +  26(fcj +  ki))-2b%  ( l  +  k\ +  e k ^ - i ^ k t h  (1 +  46) <
(2.72)
It can be easily shown that the derivative of the l.h.s. of the previous condition with respect 
to ki is always negative. Therefore, the condition which is binding is that of the smallest
firm in the industry (whose capital share is given by kn). In addition, the l.h.s. o f (2.72) is 
a polynomial of second degree in ki and one of its roots is greater than one (and, therefore,
should be discarded). Hence, after some manipulation, one concludes that in order for 
condition (2.62) to hold, one must have that kn €  [k*, AJ, where 
k* =  fr3 (fc? +  6fci +  l)  +  26fci (1 +  46)
+
(1
(26 +1) ((26 + 1) — (14" bki •+■ 6) yj((26 +1) (1 + 2fcj6))^
(1 -  ki)2 6s
If this is the case, i.e., if kn E [A;*, AJ, making use of (2.70) and setting Q1 =
(2.73)
fc(i-fci) , we
obtain:
(1 +  2bhi) (2b +  1)
(2.74)
(6 + 1  +  bki)^
In addition, making use of eqs. (2.65) and (2.74), one can easily show that if
kn €  [&*, &i], then 6 > Sn.
This completes the proof of Proposition 2. ■
Notice that from (2.74), one concludes that 6 only depends on the capital share owned 
by the largest firm in the industry. The intuition here rests on the fact that in the first period 
of the punishment path the aggregate output produced has to be large enough such that a 
very sharp price cut occurs leading all firms to earn negative profits in this period. Besides,
■ ^ ik iil» ;: •; j
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the largest firm is the one which is proportionally most affected by this price cut since it is 
the one with the highest market share in the agreement. As a result, a lower bound on the 
discount factor is clearly necessary. The discount factor has to be sufficiently high so that 
the largest firm (and, therefore, all the other firms) can recoup the one-period losses on the 
most attractive (second) phase of the punishment.
The insights of the two previous propositions can be summarized as follows. On the 
one hand, during the collusive phases the cartel maximizes its joint profit, which implies 
that the smaller the firm the lower its share in the collusive output. This implies that the 
incentive constraint that matters is that of the smallest firm. Hence, there exists a minimal 
discount factor <5n, only depending on the share in the capital of the smallest firm, above 
which all firms in the industry find it optimal to keep the cartel agreement. On the other 
hand, if the smallest firm in the market is not too small, there exists a lower bound on the 
discount factor 6, which only depends on the size of the largest firm, above which an op­
timal “proportional” two-phase penal code exists. This penal code yields for every firm a 
continuation payoff of zero after a deviation has occurred. Studying the ranking between 
the identified thresholds for the discount factor, one concludes that the necessary and suf­
ficient condition which must be met in order perfect efficient collusion to be sustainable is 
the following:
n  +.9.hkA(‘>h±^\
(2.75)£ >  (1 +  2bkj) (26 + 1 )  __ ^ 
(6 + 1  +  bki)^
In the next subsection, we study the implications of changes in the distribution of 
asset holdings (due to mergers, transfers or split-offs) on the sustainability of tacit collusion. 
By doing so, we draw some merger policy implications.
jit
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The impact of mergers on collusion
In this setting, a specific asset (namely, capital) is introduced and assumed to af­
fect firms* marginal costs (see eq. (2.45)). Hence, any merger gives rise to endogenous 
efficiency gains since it brings the individual capital of the merging firms under a single 
larger (and, hence, more efficient) resulting firm. A more delicate problem, however, is 
to understand the impact of merger-induced changes in firm’s capital allocations on the 
sustainability of tacit collusion. This is the issue we address in the present section.
The common wisdom is that mergers tend to create structural conditions which fa­
cilitate collusion. The argument typically used is that the lower the number of market 
participants, the easier it will be for them to coordinate their actions (e.g. the easier it is to 
allocate market shares) or to monitor departures from agreed-upon output levels.64 In what 
follows, however, it is shown that when cost-asymmetric firms co-exist in the market, two 
distinct effects can be induced by a merger: (z) If  firms were already colluding before the 
merger, then the merger either has no effect on the scope for collusion or it hinders collu­
sion; (zz) If, instead, before the merger collusion is not feasible, then a merger might make 
collusion enforceable afterwards.
In our setting, the effect of a merger is not restricted to a decrease in the number of 
firms. A merger also gives rise to a different distribution of assets amongst the remaining 
firms (a different post-merger capital allocation). Therefore, a natural question at this point 
is which capital reallocations can be induced by a merger. Figure 1 shows that two cases 
should be considered when analyzing this question.
64 This is a well-established argument which extends at least as far back as Stigler (1964).
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Figure 1: Merger Effects on Capital Allocation.
First, consider the situations in which before the merger kn > ^ki (e.g. allocation I  
in Figure 1). When this is the case, any merger will lead to an increase in the size of the 
largest firm. Notice, in this direction, that even if the merging firms are the two smallest 
firms in the industry, then the size of the resulting merged firm (kn 4- fc„_i) will certainly 
be greater than fcj. Take now the case in which the largest firm merges with any other firm 
but the smallest one. This will lead to an increase in the size of the largest competitor, but 
the size of the smallest firm will remain unaffected. We, thus, move along the horizontal 
arrow starting from point I  in the Figure. Hence, the capital reallocation induced by any 
merger can be represented by an arrow starting from point I  which lies between the two 
arrows that form the acute angle presented in the diagram.
Next, take any pre-merger capital allocation such that kn < ¿k\ (e.g. allocation I I  in 
Figure 1). We can still have mergers affecting the size o f the largest firm but not that of the 
smallest firm (we move along the horizontal arrow starting from point I I  in the picture).
2.3 The analysis of perfect efficient collusion 70
However, now we can also have a merger in which the size of the smallest firm increases 
but the size o f the largest one remains unaffected. Take, for instance, the situation in which 
before the merger there are two equal-sized smallest firms. If  they decide to merge, then 
the size of the new smallest firm will be kfn =  m in {2&n, but the size of the largest 
firm in the market remains unchanged since 2 kn <  fcj. A sa  result, if allocation I I  in the 
diagram is the pre-merger capital allocation, the capital reallocation induced by any m erger 
can be represented by an arrow which starts from I I  and lies within the right angle form ed 
by the arrows shown in Figure 1.
The previous discussion identified the possible capital reallocations which a m erger 
can induce. Since in this setting both the initial number of firms is given and there is a fixed 
supply of the industry capital, we can now also identify natural bounds within which capital 
shares k\ and kn can vary. Figure 2 shows a symmetry line along which kn = k\ =  
Since, by definition kn <  ku  any feasible capital allocation must lie within the region 
below this symmetry line.
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Figure 2: Merger Effects on the Feasibility Region.
The two other solid straight lines represent two extreme cases regarding the industry 
configuration. In the first case, there exists a large firm owning a share ki of the industry 
capital and the residual capital share (1 — A:i) is equally shared by the remaining (small) 
firms. In the second case, the industry is composed of a single small firm and n  — 1 
symmetric large firms. In order for the capital constraint to hold before the merger, the 
pre-merger capital allocation (A^, ki) must lie within the triangle formed by these two solid 
straight lines. If two firms decide to merge, then the number o f independent firms in the 
market is reduced by one. Therefore, the two extreme cases for the industry configuration 
are now represented by the dashed lines along which fci+(n-2)Avi =  land  (n —2)&i+fcn =  
1, respectively. As a result, the feasibility region in which the capital constraint holds after 
the merger is now represented by the triangle formed by the dashed lines.
We know that in this framework small firms have the highest incentives to deviate 
from the collusive path. This explains why in Proposition 2 a minimal level of efficiency k*
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for the smallest firm is required in order for perfect efficient collusion to be enforceable, that 
is, in order for the smallest firm not to have incentives to disrupt the collusive agreement. 
Some algebra shows that V6 >  0 G [ f c n , l ) , | ^  <  0. This is illustrated in Figure 3 
by a solid curve along which kn =  k*.65 Notice that collusion can be enforced for every 
pair (kn^ki) above this solid locus. In addition, Iim k* =  — Hence, as shown in Figure 
3, k* assumes negative values for high enough values of the capital share owned by the 
largest firm in the market. This is so because, according to the punishment scheme firms 
adopt in this setting, all the firms in the market must earn a negative profit in the first 
phase of the punishment. This implies that a lower bound exists for the aggregate output 
produced in this first phase of the punishment. More precisely, condition (2.61) implies 
that Q1 >  ¿{i l ekiy  Since this lower bound obviously increases with the size of the largest 
firm, an increase in /c2 leads to an increase in the first period losses of every firm in the  
market, that is, induces an increase of the severity of the punishment. As a result, if the  
largest firm is sufficiently large, then the severity of the punishment becomes so high that 
any small firm, no matter how small it is, will have no incentives to disrupt the collusive 
agreement.
65 As is shown in Proposition 2, the minimal level of efficiency k* does not depend on the number of firms 
in the industry, n  (see eq. (2.73)). Therefore, the solid curve kn =  k * is unaffected by a merger.
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Figure 3: Merger Effects on the Scope for Collusion (Panel a)
Figure 4: Merger Effects on the Scope for Collusion (Panel b)
In order to be able to discuss the impact of mergers on the scope for collusion, we 
also need to know how the minimal discount factor reacts to changes in firms’ capital allo­
cations. From (2.74), one concludes that the sustainability of tacit collusion only depends
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on the share in the capital o f the largest firm. In addition, some simple algebra shows that:
Hence, an increase in the size o f the largest firm will induce an increase in the mini­
mal threshold on the discount factor above which perfect efficient collusion is sustainable. 
This is illustrated in Figure 4. The intuition which underlies this result is the following. 
The larger the largest firm is, the higher will be its share on the one period losses due to the 
first phase of the punishment strategy. Therefore, the more weight has to be attached to the 
future stream of payoffs in order for this firm to comply with the punishment strategy.
Let us now tum to the discussion of merger effects on the scope for collusion. We 
know that before the merger the initial capital allocation belongs to the triangle formed by 
areas A, B  and C in Figure 3, whereas after the merger, the final capital allocation (A:n, fci) 
has to lie somewhere on the triangle formed by areas C  and D  in the same diagram. Hence, 
two different scenarios should be taken into account. First, we consider the case in which 
firms were already colluding before the merger takes place. Then, we analyze the situation 
in which industry-wide collusion was not feasible before the merger.
If before the merger firms were already colluding, this means that the initial capital 
allocation (kn, fcj) lies somewhere in regions B  or C  of Figure 3. When this is the case, 
any merger leading to an increase in the size of the largest firm will hurt collusion. All 
other mergers will have no impact on the scope for collusion. In particular, if before the 
merger > ~ku then any merger will affect the size of the largest competitor and, hence,
d6 2t? (264* 1) (1 — ki) n 
d h ~  (i + b + bfn)3 > (2.76)
and
(2.77)
2.3 The analysis of perfect efficient collusion 75
hurt collusion. This result stresses the fact that a merger induces a more asymmetric post­
merger industry configuration when it increases the size of the largest firm.66 Thus, this 
analysis stresses the fact that if collusion already exists in the industry, there may be no 
room for an improvement in firms’ ability to collude after a merger has taken place.
Notice, however, that if before the merger the number of firms is sufficiently high,67 
then the pre-merger capital allocation might lie in region A  of Figure 3. If this is the case, 
then it may be rational for more efficient firms to merge with very small and inefficient 
firms if by doing so collusion turns out to be enforceable after the merger takes place (that 
is, if after the merger the smallest firm size k'n > k*). Therefore, according to the present 
model, only in this case does a merger have anti-competitive effects as the common wisdom 
would suggest.
As a final remark, notice that (2.76) also shows that a split-off reducing the size of the 
largest firm in the industry tends to improve the scope for collusion and, hence, should give 
rise to antitrust concerns since it contributes to a more symmetric distribution of capital 
shares amongst the existing firms.
Our results therefore reveal that the conventional wisdom that mergers tend to en­
hance collusion, whereas split-offs have pro-competitive effects, may actually give mis­
66 In our framework, merger parties are taken to be exogenous. However, if the analysis was extended to 
endogenize mergers (split-offs) decisions, one would probably conclude that in the case where collusion was 
already taking place before the merger, any merger affecting the size of the largest firm would fail to occur 
in equilibrium. This would be justified by the fact that not only the merger would hurt collusion possibilities, 
but it would also have no effect on merging firm’s profits. Indeed, the sum of the profits of the merging parties 
equals the (aggregate) profit of the resulting firm (see eq. (2.53)). Notice, however, that in such a situation 
a split-off of the largest competitor would decrease asymmetries in the distribution of asset holdings and, 
therefore, would possibly be part of the equilibrium since it would enhance collusion possibilities.
67 More precisely, if n >
2fr3+(2fr-j-l)2- ( /^(26-i-l)) 3(ò-rl) 
(fr+l) -  ( V^ 2fr+Ij)
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leading predictions about the facility o f collusion after an asset transfer takes place, if we 
disregard the fact that asymmetries in cost functions tend to make coordination amongst 
oligopolists less likely. More importantly, this analysis clearly suggests that, as was em­
phasized by Compte, Jenny and Rey (1997), a systematic analysis of market shares and 
concentration indexes, such as the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI), does not always pro­
vide a reliable guide to assess potential effects on the level of competition in the market 
induced by a horizontal merger.68 Antitrust authorities, when assessing whether a merger 
between two firms is likely to enhance oligopolistic coordination in the market, should 
give special attention to firms’ cost conditions and to the degree of post-merger symme­
try among the firms in the industry.69 Even though any merger gives rise to an increase in 
the size of the merged parties and also reduces the number of competitors operating in the 
(relevant) market, this fact is not enough to conclude that the scope for collusion increases 
with the merger. It might well happen that asymmetries outweigh the collusion-enhancing 
effects of a  proposed merger.
2.4 Perfect non-efficient collusion
The previous analysis suggests that in an industry consistent with the assumptions of our 
model, the smallest and largest firms in the agreement play a crucial role on the stability 
of perfect efficient collusion. Being allotted a very small share in the collusive output 
(and profits), small firms may have no incentive to credibly participate in the collusive
68 As was highlighted by Fisher (1987), a “serious analysis of market power and oligopoly cannot be sub­
sumed in a few spuriously precise measurements ” (p. 39).
69 It is important to note that the HHI index tends to penalize asymmetry.
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agreement. On the other hand, when the equilibrium calls for punishments, the largest 
firm is the most penalized in the punishment first phase. It is, therefore, natural to wonder 
whether stability of the collusive agreement could be enhanced if large firms accepted to 
transfer part of their output share to the smallest ones, therefore allowing small firms to 
produce a disproportionate (higher) share of the collusive aggregate output. This section 
deals with precisely this issue by studying a situation in which firms accept a distortion of 
the efficient allocation rule (2.48) in order to try and enlarge the set of discount factors for 
which perfect industry-wide collusion is sustainable. Proposition 3 shows that there is a 
trade-off between efficiency and the stability of perfect collusion.
Proposition 3 Let 6 be as in Proposition 2. There exists a 6ne < 6 such that there exists a 
subgame perfect equilibrium in which perfect ( non-efficient) collusion is enforced for every
è > 6ne.
Proof. Consider an initial situation in which kn = k* and 6 = 6, where k* and 6 are 
defined by equations (2.73) and (2.74), respectively. Hence, we depart from a situation in 
which the two incentive constrains that matter along an optimal maximal punishment - that 
of the smallest firm to stick to the collusive output and that of the largest firm to stick to the 
first phase of the punishment - are just binding. Assume also, without loss of generality, 
that the number of largest and smallest firms in the market is the same. Let ki denote 
the output share of firm i, whereas ki continues to denote the share in the industry capital 
owned by firm i, i €  { 1 , n}.  Let us now consider an ^-transfer of output share from the 
largest to the smallest firm(s). When this is the case, ki = kx — e, kn = kn +  e, where
5Ü
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e < kn-i — kn, whereas k, =  kj, for all j  £  {1, n}. Firms are assumed to keep on using a 
simple proportional two-phase penal code a where Q1 ~  » Q2 — n i l  ^
gf =  kiQU for ¿ 6 ( 1 ,  n } , j  =  1,2. In order for a ^g1, g2^ to be a perfect equilibrium, 
one must have that, for all i,
<  ( ? i i )  -  7T( (g 1)  -  5 (jTj (g2)  -  7Ti (g 1) )  <  0, (2.78)
and
K  (?X ) -  *1 ( ? )  -  £  (** ( ? )  -  Xi ( ? ) )  <  0, (2.79)
where =  (g (,- ,g i-i,q f+1,...,q i)  , j  =  1,2, and «J : [0 ,f ] " -1 -> R  denotes finn
i'$ best response profit. Since we are assuming an initial situation in which kn = k* and 
8 =  6, then the previous analysis shows that when e — 0 (initially), condition (2.78) is 
binding for the largest firm(s) in the market (firm 1), whereas condition (2.79) is binding 
for the smallest firm in the agreement (firm n). To show that there exists a subgame perfect 
equilibrium in which firms enforce perfect collusion within a larger set of discount factors 
by accepting a distortion of the efficient allocation rule (2.48), it suffices to show that the 
binding incentive constraints (2.78) and (2.79) are both relaxed when there is a transfer of 
output share from the largest to the smallest firms in the market. Let us start with condition 
(2.78). This condition is binding for firm 1 when e =  0. In addition, in this setting, 
7rJ = 0. Hence, one can rewrite condition (2.78) for the largest firm, obtaining
(1 _  ¿) ( _ * !  ( ? ) )  -  &T! ( ? )  <  0, (2.80)
where 7Ti (g^) =  fa — c — bQ1^  (ki — e) Q1 — ■ for j  =  1,2. Let L\ =
( 1 - 5 )  (-7T! (g 1) )  “  Then, after some algebra and making use o f the fact
fij *},<'>
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that <3‘ =  zf= fc  • <? 2 =  ^ and^ =  L^ w ^ T r )’ one concludes 11,31I>(1—J l)*v* 26+1
d h =  -  (a -  c)‘
k i~ 2 e
< 0 .de v” ' '  ^ ( 2 6  +  1 ) ( 6 + 1  +  6 ^ )
Hence, the incentive constraint of the largest firm to stick to the first phase of the punish­
ment is relaxed when there is a (marginal) transfer of output share from the largest to the 
smallest firm(s).
Let us now analyze the effect of the above-mentioned transfer of output share on the 
incentive constraint of the smallest firm to stick to the collusive output. Condition (2.79) 
for the smallest firm n is given by
K  ( ? „ )  ~  ( ? )  -  £  (»„ ( ? )  -  ( ? ) )  <  0, (2.81)
where we have that 7t* (q l„ )  =  |  ( a  — c — 6 (1 — (kn + c ))Q 2)  y+* ^  and
7T„ ( ? )  =  ( a - c - b Q l ) ( k n +e)Q i  -  for j  =  1,2. Now,
let L„ =  7r; (q l„ )  -  7T„ ( ? )  -  £ ( tt„ (<j2)  -  trn (q 1) ) .  Some algebra shows that
* £  =  ( « - C)*(1 +  6(1 +  ^ -  ( 1 + £ ) ( ( « - c ) * J b g | L _ )
Now, notice that
(a — c) (1 4- 6 (1 -f- kn +  £))
(26 + 1 ) ^ ( 1 +  2&AV,)
-  (a -  c)2 6fcn — £
( 2 6 + i r * *
can be rewritten as
(a — c)2 (1 +  bkr) £ (1 +  bkn) bkri (1 kn)
(26 + 1)2 (1 +  26fc„) kn 
Hence, e < bk„ (1 -  kn) /  (1 +  6fc„) <  1 is a sufficient condition for +  <  0, i.e., for 
sufficiently low values of e, the incentive constraint of the smallest firm to stick to the
ISP**11*?1 hll-M' WNHtlUWjBBBBilflBIHWfllHHHWBflMMIMMiMMIIMUBBlfirljSMjl»
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collusive agreement is also relaxed by the above-mentioned (marginal) transfer of output 
share. This completes the proof of Proposition 3. ■
Hence, by accepting a distortion in the optimal allocation rule, firms can enlarge the 
set of discount factors for which perfect collusion can be credibly enforced.
Two remarks are in order before closing this section. First, notice that by transferring 
output share from the larger to the smallest firms in the market, this exercise is lessening 
asymmetries between market participants, thus contributing to increase collusion possi­
bilities. In this way, the previous Proposition confirms and extends the general intuition 
developed in the previous section. Second, it should be noted that the (extended) propor­
tional two-phase penal code used in the proof of Proposition 3 is not globally optimal. It 
does not drive all firms to their minmax payoff if a deviation occurs, but should drive the 
largest and smallest firms in the agreement close to the (zero) minmax payoff. Studying al­
ternative output allocation rules as well as proposing other types of optimal punishments 
within a more general framework will be dealt with in future research.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has explored the relationship between the distribution of a tangible industry 
asset which affects firms’ marginal costs and the scope for collusion. In particular, we 
have found the conditions under which a (perfect) collusive outcome can be enforced when 
an infinitely repeated game is played between cost asymmetric firms which produce a ho­
mogeneous good and adopt optimal punishments in the style of Abreu (1986, 1988) that 
guarantee a prospective deviant zero profits (the lowest profits consistent with individual
mm
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rationality) in the event a deviation occurs. The results obtained embody some important 
insights for practical application of competition policy.
First, we show that the sustainability of perfect efficient collusion crucially depends 
on the asset holdings of the firms involved in the agreement. In particular, it has been found 
that the smallest (and, hence, most inefficient) firm in the agreement, being the one which 
is allotted the lowest share in the collusive aggregate output, represents the main obstacle 
for collusion to be enforced because this share may be too low with respect to its optimal 
deviation output. On the other hand, if the punishment is started, then the largest firm is the 
one which is proportionally most penalized in the first (severe) phase of the punishment. 
Therefore, this firm faces the greatest incentives to deviate from the first period of the 
punishment strategy.
Second, it is shown that if firms accept to diverge from the joint-profit maximization 
behavior, then they can enhance collusion possibilities. Perfect inefficient collusion can be 
enforced within a larger set of discount factors. Therefore, in our setting, there exists a 
trade-off between efficiency and sustainability of perfect collusive agreements.
A distinct issue is also addressed, which is the impact of changes in the distribution 
of firms’ asset holdings on the likelihood of collusion. Some important policy implications 
can be derived from the results. In particular, they shed some light on the complex prob­
lem of assessing the potential joint dominance (pro-collusive) effects induced by a merger. 
It turns out that when asymmetric firms co-exist in the industry the impact of a merger de­
pends on which firms it involves. More specifically, it is shown that a merger can induce 
two distinct effects. First, if firms in the market were already colluding before the merger,
!i:1
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then a merger either has no effect on the possibility of collusion or it harms that possibil­
ity. The latter case will happen when the merger affects the size of the largest firm in the 
market. This result stresses the fact that although the number of competitors is reduced 
with the merger, which tends to facilitate collusion, this effect is more than compensated 
for by a more asymmetric post-merger industry configuration. Second, if before the merger 
collusion is not feasible, then a merger might make collusion possible afterwards. This 
will happen when the merger involves very small and inefficient firms that are not able to 
credibly participate in a collusive scheme before the merger takes place.
This analysis thus suggests that a systematic analysis of market shares and concen­
tration indexes, such as the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI), does not always provide a 
reliable guide to assess potential effects on the level of competition in the market induced 
by a horizontal merger. Once post-merger concentration appears to  be high, then, among 
other things, firms * cost conditions and asset holdings’ distribution must be an important 
part of the analysis, since asymmetries may offset any increased risk of post-merger anti­
competitive behavior.
It remains to be seen whether our results are robust to changes in the model assump­
tions: different, or more general, functional forms for cost and demand, and firm hetero­
geneity. It would also be interesting to analyze under which conditions a subset of large 
firms could reach a collusive agreement without involving small firms (partial collusion). 
All these questions seem to deserve further research.
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2A  The Cournot equilibrium
Consider the general case in which inverse demand is given by (2.43) and total cost function 
of firm i is represented by eq. (2.44). Firm i chooses $  to maximize profits:
7ft ( i i , .... in) =  (a -  bQ)qi -  ( Cfc + (2.82)
TTi (♦) is strictly concave in Hence, the choice of q* results from the following first 
order condition:
p ~  c =  ( & + £ ) * . (2.83)
Define pi — —^ 7  and B — J2 Pi- Now, from (2.83), it can be shown that
1 t=i
for i , j  = {1, ,.,n} , i 7^  j . Hence, the following results can be easily derived:
f ° ~ cN\ f t
9i V * /  1 + £ ’
a +  cB 
P= l + B '
x» = 3L = !k  
‘ ~  (? £ ’
1 , \2 «
c) % ( i  +  B )2fe,'
(2.84)
(2.85)
(2.86)
(2.87)
(2.88)
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Chapter 3
Towards a Characterization of the Upper 
Bound to Concentration in Endogenous Sunk
Cost Industries
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this study is to provide empirically testable implications regarding the rela­
tionship between market size and concentration in endogenous sunk cost industries (Sutton 
(1991,1998)), that is, industries in which firms are involved in research and development 
(henceforth R&D) activities with the aim of enhancing consumer’s willingness to pay for 
the products they offer.
Following Sutton (1998), this study assumes that the market in which firms operate 
encompasses a (discrete) set of feasible technological trajectories along which firms can 
develop their capabilities. Firms are confined to operate along a single distinct technologi­
cal trajectory. In addition, each trajectory is assumed to be associated with a different group 
o f products or submarket. A firm spending more on R&D outlays will be able to improve 
the quality o f the product it offers within the submarket associated with the trajectory along 
which it is operating.70
A fixed cost function, proposed by Sutton (1991,1998), is introduced. This function
maps a spectrum of quality of products offered into an endogenous fixed cost which must
70 For the sake of simplicity, each firm's technological capability is assumed to be summarized by a single 
quality attribute.
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be incurred and sunk before production begins. Hence, in this setting, each firm’s choice 
set comprises not only the quantity to be produced, but also the quality which the firm aims 
to achieve along the chosen R&D trajectory.
Sutton (1991,1998) has shown that, under very general conditions, a lower bound 
exists to the equilibrium level of concentration in endogenous sunk cost industries, inde­
pendently of how large the market is. As pointed out by Bresnahan (1992) and Scherer 
(2000), a question not addressed there, however, is whether or not an upper bound to the 
degree of concentration can be characterized in this kind of industries.
In this chapter, this open question is addressed by posing the strategic behavior of 
firms in terms of a four-stage noncooperative game. At the first stage, firms decide whether 
or not to enter the industry. Those firms which decided to enter must incur a fixed (sunk) 
cost of entry e. At the second stage, firms that have entered might form coalitions. All firms 
that have chosen the same coalition then merge. At the third stage, the newly formed coali­
tions simultaneously choose the quality level of the product they offer and incur an associ­
ated fixed cost. Finally, at the fourth and last stage of the game, firms/coalitions compete by 
choosing output levels in accordance with the usual Cournot oligopoly model. If a merger 
occurs, then the involved firms share the final stage profit and also the cost associated with 
the investment in fixed outlays. Therefore, in this setting, firms have a double incentive to 
participate in a merger. Apart from reducing competition in the market, a merger allows 
the involved firms to realize a cost advantage over the unmerged rivals. When firms merge, 
they afford a cost reduction through the elimination of duplication efforts in their R&D in­
vestments and, hence, the incentive for merger is reinforced. As pointed out by Kamien and
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Zang (1993), “despite the systematization of research and development (R&D), there still 
remains a significant component o f trial and error. Common research activity allows for 
more efficient weeding out of fruitless approaches and concentration on the most promis­
ing.” (p. 24).
As far as the coalition formation game is concerned, we adopt a (coalitional) stabil­
ity concept which differs from standard stability concepts like Nash stability in two ways. 
First, it also requires stability with rspect to deviations by a group of players/firms. Second 
it rules out the assumption that once a coalition deviation occurs, it cannot be followed by 
subsequent deviations,71 an assumption which is unwarranted. By allowing players/firms to 
look far ahead, the proposed stability concept addresses two related questions: (i) whether 
a deviation is vulnerable to further deviations; and (ii) which is the ultimate result a devi­
ation will lead to. Obviously, an ultimate result must, by definition, be immune to further 
deviations. In addition, it must be part of the solution set of the coalition formation game. 
This study thus relates to a strand o f the literature on farsighted stability. A sample of re­
cent works on this area, though in different contexts, includes the papers by Chwe (1994), 
Xue (1998) and Diamantoudi and Xue (2001). We also confront the predictions obtained 
applying the Nash stability concept with the ones obtained when using the proposed con­
cept where players are assumed to be endowed with foresight. By so doing, one concludes 
that Nash stability fails to rule out a laige set of coalition structures due to players* myopic 
behavior embedded in this notion.
71 Nash stability, as wel 1 as other standard stability concepts, considers only one-step deviations by firms/playeis.
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Analysis of the (refined) subgame perfect Nash equilibria (henceforth, (refined) SPE) 
of this game discloses that,72 when comparing this model with a basic model in which firms 
are not allowed to merge, the anticipation of the possibility to form coalitions gives rise to 
a pattern of excessive entry in the earliest stage of the game. The industry is subsequently 
whittled down by the (endogenous) mergers formation game, through which firms cooper­
ate in their R&D efforts to enhance products’ quality. In particular, it is shown that there 
exists a threshold value for the parameter measuring the degree of product substitutabil­
ity above which a merger to monopoly is the equilibrium outcome even in the limit when 
market size goes to infinity. Therefore, this study shows that in endogenous sunk cost indus­
tries, an upper bound to concentration exists and is independent of the size of the market. 
Interestingly, in some equilibria where a merger to monopoly arises as the unique equilib­
rium outcome, it turns out that firms belonging to the monopoly coalition structure earn 
strictly positive profits even under the threat of entry. In addition, it is also shown that if, 
instead, the degree product substitutability is below the above mentioned threshold value 
but still product substitutability is not too low, then only duopoly coalition structures com­
posed of sufficiently size asymmetric coalitions can be sustained in a (refined) SPE. The 
intuition that underlies this result is simple. The larger the size of the smaller coalition 
in the duopoly coalition structure is, the more likely is that firms in that specific coalition 
will be willing to participate in a (joint) deviation towards complete monopolization of the 
industry, therefore ruling out the stability of the coalition structure they belong to.
72 Remember that, when solving the game backwards, we apply at the second stage of the game the proposed 
farsighted stability concept instead of the standard Nash stability concept.
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To the best of our knowledge, the only paper that addresses the question of whether 
there exists an upper bound to concentration in endogenous sunk cost industries is Nocke 
(2000). His predictions are, however, not entirely satisfactory because of the following 
reasons. First, the coalition formation game is modelled as a noncooperative open mem­
bership game (see Yi (1997)) and, therefore, firms are implicitly assumed to be myopic 
when taking their mergers decisions. Second, and most importantly, due to several reasons 
explained in the paper, Nocke is not able to solve for all equilibria at the investment (third) 
stage o f his four-stage game. As a result, instead of solving the overall game initially pro­
posed, the paper analyzes a “constrained game” in which firms are not allowed to merge. 
By so doing, the chapter contributes to the characterization of the lower-bound to the one 
firm concentration ratio that can arise in equilibrium in endogenous sunk costs industries.
The rest o f the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general model 
and the coalition formation game. This section also characterizes and discusses the out­
comes that can arise in a (refined) SPE of the overall game. Finally, section 3 offers some 
concluding comments.
3.2 The basic model
Following Sutton (1998), let all consumers have the same utility function defined over n 
substitute goods (or n varieties of the same product), and a separate outside good whose 
price is fixed exogenously at unity. Let the utility function take the form
(3.89)
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where x* is the quantity and uk is the quality level of good fc, M  denotes the consumption 
of the outside good and the parameter <7, 0 <  cr <  1, measures the degree of substitution 
between the goods. When ¿7 =  0, product varieties are independent in demand, whereas as 
& —► 1, existent varieties become closer and closer substitutes.
For the general utility function (3.89), the individual consumer’s inverse demand for 
good k becomes,
Notice that as uk -*  0, demand falls to zero for any given pk > 0. On the other hand, 
an increase in uky shifts the (linear) demand outward, that is, enhances the consumers’ 
willingness to pay for good k.
Assuming that there are S  identical consumers in the market, market demand for 
good k is just a multiple S  of individual demand. Simplifying notation, use xk to denote 
the per-capita output of good k so that total output of good k is written as S xk.
3,2.1 The game
Consider now a four-stage game as follows. At the first stage, a sufficiently large number 
of ex-ante identical firms No simultaneously decide whether or not to enter the market. 
The entry cost is denoted by £\73 We assume that the number of potential entrants No at 
stage one is large enough so that at least one player will decide not to enter the market 
at this stage. At the second stage, firms that have decided to enter at the preceding stage, 
simultaneously choose which “coalition” to join. All firms that have decided to join the
73 Of course, we assume in what follows that the market is viable, in the sense that the entry cost e is no 
larger than the monopoly profits.
(3.90)
3.2 The basic model 90
same coalition then merge. At the third stage, the newly formed coalitions simultaneously 
choose a quality level u* for the single product they offer and incur a fixed cost
where ¡3 is the elasticity of the investment function with respect to the quality level tt*. We 
restrict qualities to the interval [l,oo) and ¡3 > 2. Hence, a firm (say, firm i) must incur
level Ui =  1. Increases in spending in R&D beyond this minimal level are associated with 
increases in the quality of the product offered by the firm. Finally, there is a fourth stage in 
which firms compete a la Cournot.
Assume all the ‘quality goods* are produced at some constant marginal cost c,74 which 
we normalize to zero. Assume also that each firm operates along a distinct R&D trajectory 
and produces one product, each trajectory being occupied by just one firm.75 In the Nash 
equilibrium in quantities (Cournot equilibrium), the profit function in a market of size S  in 
which N  firms (products) have positive sales at equilibrium is given by:76
where Ui denotes the quality of firm i's product and u  denotes the average quality of all 
products that have positive sales at equilibrium, tZ =  u0  / N .77
74 Following Sutton (1991, 1998), this assumption implies that the burden of quality improvement falls 
primarily on fixed cost.
75 Hence, a  is thought of as a measure of the degree of substitution between products associated with differ­
ent technological trajectories (submarkets, product groups).
76 For the derivation of this reduced form profit function, see Appendix 2.2 in Sutton (1998).
77 As can be seen from (3.92), the profit function increases with v \. Hence, the restriction 0 > 2 ensures 
that F(ui)  rises with u* at least as rapidly as profit.
F{ut) =  u f , (3.91)
a minimum level of cost of one to enter the industry with a product of (minimal) quality
(3.92)
■HI
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The merger formation
In the merger formation stage, stage 2, each of the N  firms (1 <  N  < N0 — 1) that 
have committed to enter the market at stage 1, decides whether or not to form coalitions. In 
particular, each firm i € {1,..., N} simultaneously announces a list of players (including 
itself) with whom it is willing to form a coalition. The firms that announce exactly the same 
list of firms form a coalition. This coalition formation game was first proposed by Hart and 
Kurz (1983).
In formal terms, each firm ¿’s strategy is to choose a set of firms S \  which is a subset 
of the set of entrants { 1 , N }  and includes firm i. The set of strategies for firm i is, there­
fore, £* =  { 5  C {1, i €  5}. Given firms’s announcements a  =  (S'1, ...,SN), the 
resulting coalition structure is C  =  { C i,..., CV}, where T  denotes the number of different 
lists chosen by the N  entrants. O C:- = 0 for i ^  j  and UJ=1Ci =  {1, N}. Firms i 
and j  belong to the same coalition C* if and only if S ' =  SK Notice, however, that S* (re­
spectively, S j) is the largest set of firms firm i (respectively, firm j )  would be willing to be 
associated with in the same coalition. As a result, the coalition C* may in general be dif­
ferent from S' (respectively, SJ). A coalition, in this setting, corresponds to an equivalent 
class, with respect to equality of strategies.
Each of the N0 firms is assumed to maximize its own profit. The same applies to the 
merged entities at the quantity setting stage. The members of each coalition share both the 
final stage profit and the investments in R&D outlays. Since all firms are symmetric, we 
assume that profit and investment outlays are equally shared. That is, any side payments 
are ruled out with respect to membership decisions.
V ! j." !'. ! ! !’ "! !!isw
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3.2.2 Equilibrium analysis
In this section we look for a (refined) SPE of this game, following the usual backward 
induction procedure, starting with the last stage of the game where the merged entities 
compete in quantities.
Quantity-setting stage
Suppose that at the end o f stage two, we have N2 firms/coalitions o f firms, where 
N2 < N  < No. Hence, from (3.92) one has that the profit earned by a firm offering quality 
Ui in the final stage sub-game is given by
Sit (Ui IN2j U)
1 f + ( m - u ) i 2
2 1 2 + (N2 - l ) c r  ƒ ’ (3.93)
where u =  ( £ \  tu) /N 2.
Investment stage
Armed with the above expression for profits, it is now possible to look at firm’s 
quality choice. Notice that we are only interested in a symmetric outcome in which, at 
stage 3, Vi 6  (1 ,..., A2}, =  v.n Besides, N2 is taken as a parameter since it is the
outcome of firms’ choices made at stage 2.
As pointed out by Sutton (1998), the equilibrium involves two regimes that corre­
spond to low and high values of the market size parameter S. In particular, at stage 2, the 
equilibrium outcome takes one of two forms, according as whether an internal or comer 78
78 Notice that fixed costs apart, coalitions of firms operate as independent entities which are similar in all 
other aspects. Therefore, it seems natural to focus on a symmetric equilibrium at the investment stage.
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solution applies, that is:
c  f a  K M , « )
du.
<
Ui=V—1
dF(uj)
dtii tli=U=l
(3.94)
or otherwise.
Hence, if market size (as measured by S ) is sufficiently small, then condition (3.94) 
holds and, therefore, at equilibrium all firms that have entered the market at stage 1 will 
choose v =  1. If, instead, market size is sufficiently large, then the above condition fails to 
hold and at equilibrium all the N% coalitions of firms formed at stage 2 will choose a value 
of v > 1 determined by the following condition
dir (Uj IJV2, u)
dui u,=u
9F(uj)
dui
(3.95)
Ui=v
The critical level of S  is defined by writing condition (3.94) as an equality. In what follows, 
we assume that 5  is above this critical value so that v > 1 at equilibrium. From (3.93), on
writing N 2U ~Ui + (N2 — 1) v, one obtains that
dir (Ui IN2, u)
or, equivalently
du;
dit {ui
= S
Ui=V
v(2 +  g'(Ar2 — 2 ))
(2 +  a  (iV2 — l) ) 2 (2 — <r) ’
dui Ui=V
„1  ,  ^ 2(2 +  (Ni — 2))
=  5 ; *  M M ------- -----------------
On the other hand, from (3.91) it is straightforward to show that
dFiui)
dui «¿=v
=  - m v ) -
V
(3.96)
(3.97)
(3.98)
Now, making use of expressions (3.97) and (3.98) to write (3.95) in explicit form, one 
obtains
Sit {v \N*,v) ■ (2 (3'99)
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where this equation defines the level of fixed outlays incurred by firms/coalitions as a func­
tion of the number o f active firms/coalitions at the end o f stage 2, N2 OY* < N  < N0), In 
what follows, let F*(N%; 5, a) denote the value of F  implicitly defined by equation (3.99). 
The following Lemma summarizes the equilibrium behavior at the investment stage.
Lem m a 1 At a symmetric equilibrium, in which Vi €  { 1 , N 2 }, Ui =  v,
= [ S  2 +  c  (Nj — 2)
V ~ \ 0 ( 2 - t r ) ( 2  + ( N i - l ) a ) 2) ’
where v decreases in N2, the number o f active firms/coalitions at the end of stage 2.
Proof. Notice that one can use (3.91) and (3.93) to express (3.99) in explicit form and 
obtain a solution for the equilibrium value of v as a function of the parameters of the model. 
By so doing, one gets
f S  2 + <r(N2 - 2 )  I»-»
\ P ( 2 - o) ( 2 +  (iV2 — 1)<t)2J
(3.100)
As mentioned above, N2 is a parameter at this stage. It results from firms’ decisions at stage
2. One can now use (3.100) to study how the equilibrium value of v reacts to a change in
the number of firms/coalitions active at the end of stage 2, N2.
dv ^ _________ —a  (2 -f cr (AT2 — 3))_________ /  5  (2 +  (7 (N2 — 2))
dN2 (2 +  ff(Nt - 2 ) ) { 2  +  f f ( N i - \ ) ) { p - 2 )  \ p  (2 + cr (N2 -  l ) f  (2 -  a) )  <
(3.101)
Hence, an increase in the number of firms/coalitions (as measured by N2) induces a de­
crease in the (symmetric) equilibrium quality level v. ■
It is worth remarking at this point that from (3.100), one can see that increases in 
the market size 5  are associated with an increasing (common) level of the quality offered
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at equilibrium by firms/coalitions in the market at stage 3.79 This feature of the model 
will play a central role later on in explaining why in endogenous sunk costs industries the 
industry structure does not converge to a fragmented outcome, no matter how large the 
market becomes (as shown in Sutton (1998)).
M erger formation stage
We can now consider firms* merger decisions at the second stage of the game. By 
participating in a coalition, firms share both investments in R&D (therefore, avoiding du­
plication of efforts) and the profits obtained at the quantity competition final stage.
The nonfragm entation result
Notice that since we are seeking a symmetric perfect equilibrium of this game, it 
follows that, at stage 3, all firms will choose the same level of quality and, therefore, incur 
the same level of fixed outlays F* (Ay S, a) >  1. Besides, all coalitions active at the end of 
stage 2 expect to earn nonnegative profits, which implies that AT2 must satisfy the following 
viability condition
Sir (vlA/^v) — F(v) >  0. (3.102)
Now, combining equations (3.99) and (3.102), one finds an upper bound for the equilibrium 
number of firms/coalitions (lower bound to concentration) at the end of stage 2
JV2 < 8 (2 ~ Z l ~ *Sl - £  s  W2 (/?, c ). (3.103)
2(7
This is the nonfragmentation result. It shows that, as long as a is strictly positive,
so that there is some degree of substitution among products, the lower bound to the one
79 Remember that we have assumed that market size is sufficiently high so that investment in R&D outlays 
is profitable (see discussion of eqs. (3.94) and (3.95)).
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firm concentration ratio is bounded away from zero in endogenous sunk cost industries, no 
matter how large the market is (see Sutton (1991)).80 The intuition underlying this result 
is the following. Consider a configuration in which, in the limit, as market size becomes 
indefinitely large, the number of firms/coalitions rises without bound. If this is the case, 
then firms/coalitions will all have very small market shares and their revenues, relative to 
market size 5 , will be small as well. Now, from (3.102), each firm/coalition’s revenue 
should at least cover its fixed outlays. As a consequence, in such a configuration, each 
firm/coalition’s fixed outlay would be very small. This could not be an equilibrium. Some 
firm/coalition would find it optimal to break this fragmented outcome by increasing its 
fixed outlays (and, hence, quality), outspending its rivals, thereby capturing a large share 
of the market. As a result, the outcome of this process is that, in the limit, as market size 
increases, firms/coalitions’ investment outlays rise proportionally with market size and the 
number of firms/coalitions which can be supported in equilibrium becomes limited and 
independent of market size.
One can now use (3.103) to carry out a simple exercise o f comparative statics with 
respect to the substitution parameter a and to the cost parameter ƒ?, obtaining
Hence, as pointed out by Sutton (1998), for a given value of /?, a fall in the degree 
of substitution between products associated with different technological trajectories shifts
80 Notice that if o —*■ 0, the upper bound for the equilibrium number of firms/coalitions at the end of stage 2 
rises without bound (N 2 {0, a) —► 0 0 ).
dN2 (Pi a) _  ¡3 -2
f)/T rr 2 1 (3.104)
(3.105)
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the incentives away from an escalation of spending on R&D outlays towards the intro­
duction of new varieties. Therefore, the lower bound to the one firm concentration ratio, 
C\ =  1/ (TvJ (ft cr)), increases in the substitutability parameter a. On the other hand, 
for any fixed value of a , a decrease in the parameter ¡3 leads to an increase in the effec­
tiveness of R&D investments since it lowers the cost of improving technical performance 
(see equation (3.91)). This encourages escalation investments on R&D to improve techni­
cal performance and, hence, tends to increase concentration levels at equilibrium. In other 
words, Ci decreases in the effectiveness of R&D parameter f t
In what follows, we study the individual firms’ incentives towards the participation in 
coalitions. In particular, we characterize the stable coalition structures that can arise under 
two alternative stability notions. First, we analyze the coalitions that can form at stage 2 
by applying the well known Nash stability concept. We then proceed by introducing an 
alternative (coalition) stability notion that amends the firms’ myopic behavior embedded 
in the Nash stability notion, by assuming that players are farsighted. It turns out that the 
latter stability concept enables us to make much sharper predictions than the former one 
with regards to the coalitions that are likely to form in equilibrium.
Nash stability
Let II (C*; C) denote the per member equilibrium payoff of a coalition Ci under the 
coalition structure C. In addition, for a given coalition structure C, let Cj(i) denote the set 
of coalitions to which firm i could migrate through an individual deviation. More formally, 
if initially i E  C* C C, Cj(i) =  {Cj E C, Cj ^  C*| Vi E C j,i E S *}.
98
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The following definition turns out to play a central role in the identification of equi­
librium coalition structures.
Definition 1 Stand-alone stability (cf. Yi (1997)): C  =  { C \,..., CT} is stand-alone sta­
ble if and only i f ' ik  € {1 ,...,T } , Vi € Ck, II (C*; C) >  n  ({»} ; CJ). where C[ -  C \  Ck U
{ a  \
A coalition structure C  is stand-alone stable if and only if no firm can unilaterally im­
prove its payoff by forming a singleton coalition, holding the rest of the coalition structure 
(including its former coalition) fixed.
Definition 2 Nash stability: A coalition structure C  = ..., CT) is the outcome of
a Nash equilibrium if there do not exist i 6  C*, k  €  { 1 , T } , and S  €  Cj(i) U {0} 
such that n  (5  U {i} ; C) >  n  (Ck; CN). where CN =  C \  {C*, 5} U {Ck \  {i} , S  U {i}}.
Hence, a coalition structure C is said to be the outcome of a Nash equilibrium if no player 
has incentives to either (individually) migrate to another coalition also in C whose members 
permit him to do so or to stay alone in a new singleton coalition.
Proposition 1 Let C — { C \ , C?} be the coalition structure induced by the vector of 
firms' announcements a  =  (S 1, . . . ,5 A ). I f V k €  {1, . . . ,T } , Vi £ Ck, 5 1 =  C*, then the 
coalition structure C is the outcome of a Nash equilibrium of the (endogenous) coalition 
game if and only if  C is stand-alone stable.
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Proof. First, suppose the coalition structure C is stand-alone stable. Since we have as­
sumed that V/c €  {1, . . . ,T } , Vi €  Ckl S 1 =  Ckt no firm i € Ck can join an alternative coali­
tion Ck> in C, k ' ^  fc, by unilaterally deviating, i.e., C, (i) =  {0}. The only feasible individ­
ual deviation for a firm is to leave its own coalition and form a singleton coalition, holding 
the rest of the coalition structure unchanged. However, C is assumed to be stand-alone sta­
ble and, therefore, no player finds it optimal to form a one-firm coalition. Next, suppose 
the coalition structure C is not stand-alone stable. If this is the case, there exists at least 
one firm (say, firm j )  which can benefit by leaving its coalition in order to form a singleton 
coalition, holding the rest of the coalition structure fixed. Let firm j  belong to coalition Cu
i.e., Sj =  where l € { 1 , T ). If j  leaves coalition Cu by changing its announcement 
to {j}, then the induced coalition structure is Cj = C \  Ct U {Ci \  {j} , j} .  Now, firm j  is 
better off after its unilateral deviation, because, by hypothesis, II ({ j} ; C j) >  II (C/; C).
This completes the proof. ■
The next Corollary shows the existence of an unmerged Nash equilibrium for the 
coalition formation game, that is, an equilibrium in which there are no mergers.
Corollary 1 For every number of entrants N  < No, the coalition structure {{1} ,{2} ,..., {N}} 
constitutes a Nash equilibrium to the coalition formation game.
Proof. By definition, the coalition structure {{1} , {2} ,..., {N}}  is stand-alone stable. 
Now, applying Proposition 1, one has that { { 1 } ,{ 2 } ,...,{TV}} is the outcome of a Nash 
equilibrium in the coalition formation game. ■
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Hence, this framework encompasses as a special case the degenerate coalition struc­
ture {{1} , {2},..., {iV}} in which each coalition is composed of a single member (firm).
In what follows, for simplicity of analysis, let us focus on the case in which the in­
dustry is partitioned into coalitions of the same size (say, m  members, where 2 <  m  <  N ). 
When this is the case, according to the stand-alone stability requirement, merger behavior 
in the second stage will depend on the trade-off between the profits that each player antic­
ipates to earn by participating in one of the N /m  coalitions with the ones he would obtain 
as the lone holdout. Remember that firms/coalitions are assumed to operate along a single 
technological trajectory, on the one hand, and we are seeking a symmetric SPE, in which at 
the investment stage 3, Vi €  {1,..., Ar2}, u* =  v, on the other. These assumptions imply that 
the per-member equilibrium profit II (CJ; C) of a coalition C* under coalition structure C 
will, in this setting, be characterized by the number and the size of the coalitions in the mar­
ket. In particular, let Cs ~  { { 1 , m} , {m  +  1 ,..., 2m} , { N  — m  -I-1 , N}}.  Then,
Hence, applying Definition 1, the coalition structure Cs is said to be stand-alone stable if 
and only if the following incentive compatibility constraint holds
m
1 Sir (3.106)
m
or, equivalently
(3.107)
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Now, from (3.99), one has that
S'K (v |N2,v)
(3.108)F*{N2;Sy<r) 2 (2 +  a (N2 -  2)) '
Combining (3.107) and (3.108), one can rewrite the incentive compatibility constraint as 
follows
1  £ I 2 - £ ) ______t U  ? • ( £ ■+ ______ (3109)
m  (2 + 17 (m — 2)) V "  \ 2 (2 +  <T( S - 1)) '
In what follows, we investigate whether, in endogenous sunk cost industries, arbi­
trarily concentrated outcomes, namely monopoly or a symmetric duopoly, can be sustained 
as outcomes of a Nash equilibrium of the coalition formation game. In particular, next 
Proposition shows that complete monopolization of the industry at stage 2 can only oc­
cur in equilibrium as long as the effectiveness of R&D investments (as measured by 0 ) is 
sufficiently high or there is no excessive entry at the entry first stage of the game.
Proposition 2 A coalition structure composed of a single ‘grand* coalition {1,..., N } is
the outcome of a Nash equilibrium of the coalition formation game if and only if:
•  2 <  0  <  4 /  (2 — a), or
• ¡3 > 4 /  (2 — o) and N  <  N  (/?, <r) |N=m , where
N (0 ,*) \ N - m  —
(2 +  q)2 ( 2 - ( 7 ) \ 9-2 2 ( 0 - 2 )
8 )  0 ( 2 - a ) - A '
Proof. In the case of a merger to monopoly, m = N  and V i e  { l ,...,A r}, 
S 1 =  ... =  S N ~  {1 Hence, V i € (1 ,..., N ) , Cj(i) =  {0}. The only feasi­
ble deviation for any firm i is to leave the ‘grand’ coalition and form a singleton coalition.
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Applying Proposition 1 and re-evaluating condition (3.109) for the case in which m  = N,  
some algebra shows that the ‘grand’ coalition is sustainable as a Nash equilibrium of the 
coalition formation game if and only if
'/? (2 — ¿r) — 41  m  > F*(2;S,a) ( p ( 2 - * ) - \  
N {P 2 ) (3.110)
Two different cases should now be considered. First, consider the case in which 2 <  ¡3 < 
4 /  (2 — a). When this is the case, the l.h.s. of condition (3.110) is always non-negative, 
while the r.h.s. is always non-positive.81 Hence, condition (3.110) is trivially satisfied. 
Second, if /? > 4 /  (2 — c ), then some algebra shows that condition (3.110) holds if  and 
only if
~ F ’(2-,S,a) 1 l)
One can now use (3.91) and (3.100) to express F*(l; 5, a)/F*(2; S , a) in explicit form. By
doing so, it turns out that
f ( l ; 5 , g )  = f (2 +  (2 -  <r)X S' 2
F'{2\S,a)  l 8 (3.112)
Thus, combining (3.111) and (3.112), one concludes that, when /? >  4 /  (2 — <r), a merger 
to monopoly can be supported in equilibrium if and only if
^  / (2 +  <^ ( 2  —c r A -  (P,a)\N=m. (3.113)
This completes the proof. ■
Figure 1 shows the relevant viability regions in the (a, ¡3) space and contributes to 
the understanding of the intuition which underlies the result in Proposition 1.
81 Remember that F* (N2 ; S, a) > 1.
■TO?",
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Figure 1 - Viability Regions
The different solid lines were constructed making use of eq. (3.103). For each region 
between these lines, one can identify the maximum number of coalitions of firms which 
are viable (i.e., earn non-negative payoffs) at equilibrium. In region A , one can have at 
most one coalition earning non-negative profits at equilibrium. In regions B and C\ the 
maximum number of viable coalitions at equilibrium is two and three, respectively.
Let us start by considering the case in which 2 < / ? < 4 / ( 2  — a) (region A in Figure 
1). If more than one firm enter the market at stage one, then a single ‘grand’ coalition 
is formed at stage 2. Two different effects, implied by the viability condition, justify this 
result. First, a merger to monopoly is the only rational action for firms in the market at stage
2. Both in the situation where there are no mergers and in the case where mergers occur but 
more than one coalition is formed, firms/coalitions in the market end up earning negative 
payoffs. Second, and as a consequence, once the ‘grand’ coalition is formed, no firm has 
incentives to unilaterally deviate from its strategy. Free-riding on the TV — 1 merging rivals
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would never be a best reply for a firm since the deviator would earn negative profits at 
equilibrium.
Consider now the case where 0 > 4 / ( 2  — a). A merger to monopoly leads to the 
formation of a single ‘grand’ coalition with N  member firms. By sticking to the strategy of 
joining this ‘grand* coalition, a firm belonging to the initial wave of N  entrants will get a 
share 1 / N  o f the coalition overall profit, whereas by free-riding on its N  — 1 merging rivals 
it can obtain the duopoly profit (net of the respective fixed costs). As a consequence, the 
higher the number of entrants at stage 1, N f the greater the incentives to free-ride, which in 
turn implies that the merger to monopoly is more difficult to sustain as a Nash equilibrium 
of the coalition formation game. In other words, complete monopolization is found to be 
infeasible when the number of firms entering at stage 1 becomes sufficiently large.8283
Figure 1 can also be used to illustrate the comparative statics results provided by eqs. 
(3.104) and (3.105). First, take some fixed 0  > 2 and allow a to vary in its domain [0,1], If 
goods associated with different trajectories become closer substitutes in consumption, then 
escalation is profitable. A firm spending heavily in R&D outlays along one trajectory will 
be able to capture sales in submarkets other than its own (“business stealing effect”). Hence, 
if a is high, at equilibrium, only a limited number of firms will survive. Concentration 
cannot be low. Second, for a given value of a  €  [0,1], an increase in the effectiveness of 
R&D (i.e., a decrease in the cost parameter 0) induces a decrease in the upper bound to the 823
82 In the limiting case where the cost parameter 0  —+ oo, so that it becomes arbitrarily expensive to raise 
the quality level above unity (exogenous sunk cost industries), condition (3.113) discloses that no merger to 
monopoly will occur in an SPE as long as u < 0.82843.
83 Properties of the upper bound to the number of entrants N  (0, a) ] A-=m, given by (3.113), will be studied 
later on (see Figure 2).
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number of active firms at the end of stage 2 of the game, N2 (/?, cr). In particular, as already 
mentioned, if, for a given a 6 [0,1], 2 <  p  <  4 / (2 -  cr), then only one coalition will be 
active at the end of stage 2 no matter how large the market becomes and, hence, the one 
firm concentration ratio attains its maximum.
Notice that, in order to further characterize the stable coalition structures in our set­
ting, we have to consider now the cases in which mergers do not lead to a complete monop­
olization of the industry. In particular, we will now turn to the analysis of the conditions 
under which a stable coalition structure composed of two individual coalitions of the same 
size (merger to a symmetric duopoly) can arise as the outcome of a Nash equilibrium of 
the coalition formation game. In what follows, firms are allowed to adopt any strategy pro­
file which supports a symmetric duopoly as an outcome.84 Hence, apart from stand-alone 
stability, one has to check whether there are incentives for firms to (unilaterally) migrate to 
the other coalition in the same coalition structure, when that is feasible.
The next Lemma puts forward the conditions in order for a duopoly coalition struc­
ture composed of equal sized coalitions to be stand-alone stable, whereas Proposition 3 
checks whether there are incentives for firms organized in such a coalition structure to 
migrate between coalitions, when they are allowed to do so by firms in the welcoming 
coalition.
Notice that the analysis that follows obviously assumes that ¡3 > 4 /((2  — cr)) (i.e., 
we are now considering regions B, C and D of Figure l).85
84 In particular, we are not restricting the analysis to the strategy profiles considered in Proposition 1, which, 
as has been shown, were the only type of strategy profile that could support a single ‘grand’ coalition as an 
equilibrium outcome (see Proposition 2).
85 Otherwise, two coalitions at the end of stage 2 would not be viable and, therefore, studying mergers to
t i i f K r f t f i t i r t r i r l r i r t i f rrirtrtiftr thn rmi m i - - nil
3.2 The basic model 106
Lemma 2 A coalition structure composed of two coalitions o f the same size N /2 is stand­
alone stable if and only if:
• 4 / ( (2  -  cr)) < /?  <  2 (2 +  <r) /  (2 — cr), or
¡3 > 2 (2 +  cr) /  (2 — a) and N  < N  (¡3, cr) |N=2m ' Wkere
(2 +  g) ((3 ( 2 -  <?)- 4) 
(3(2 — cr) — 2(2 + o) '
Proof. Take the case in which the industry is composed of two coalitions of the same 
size, m  =  N/2.  Now, re-evaluating condition (3.109) for the case in which m  =  N / 2, one 
concludes that this coalition structure is stand-alone stable if and only if:
F*(3; 5 , cr) / /?  (2 — cr) — 2 (2 +  <j )1 ^ (3 ; ,0) f ,
j j ( (3 ( 2 - ^ ) - 4 ) > f . (2;S;<7) (■ !) -
(3.114)(2 +  <t)
Now, two different cases should be considered. First, if 4 /((2  — <r)) <  < 2 (2 +  o) /  (2 — a),
then the l.h.s. of condition (3.114) is always non-negative, while the r.h.s. of the same con­
dition is always non-positive. Therefore, condition (3.114) is trivially satisfied for this 
range o f parameter values. Second, if (3 > 2 (2 +  cr) /  (2 — cr), then some algebra shows 
that condition (3.114) holds if and only if
F*(2;S,a)  (2 +  cr) (¡3 (2 — cr) — 4) 
- F * ( 3 ; S , t r )  /?(2 — cr) — 2(2 +  <j )
(3.115)
We can now combine eqs. (3.91) and (3.100) to express F*(2;S,cr)/F*(3; 5, o) in 
explicit form. By doing so, we obtain
F'(2-,S,a) =  f 8(l +  q )2 ,| ^  
F'(3;S,a)  1 ( 2  +  a)3 )
(3.116)
duopoly for that range of parameter values would not make any sense.
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Therefore, combining (3.115) and (3.116), one concludes that, whenever 
/? >  2 (2 +  o') /  (2 -  o)y a coalition structure composed of two equal sized coalitions is 
stand-alone stable if and only if
N / 8 ( i + * y \  
~  \ ( 2  + ° ? )
( 2 ± a )  ( g £ - g } -  4) =  w  .
/ ? ( 2 - c r ) - 2 ( 2  + a) “  ; |*=2m* (3.117)
This completes the proof. ■
Two remarks are in order at this point. First, notice that the intuition behind this 
Lemma is very similar to the one underlying the result in Proposition 2. If 
4 /((2  — a)) < ¡3 <  2 (2 +  a) /  (2 — a) (Region B  in Figure 1), then at most two coali­
tions are viable in equilibrium, which in turn implies that whatever the number of coalition 
members is, an unilateral deviation towards the formation of a singleton coalition is never 
going to be profitable. If, instead, ¡3 > 2 (2 +  a) /  (2 — a) (Regions C and D in Figure 
1), then by sticking the strategy of forming a symmetric duopoly, each of the N  entrants 
will earn a share 2/N  of the net duopoly profit, while by free-riding on the N  — 1 rivals, it 
earns the triopoly profits. As a result, an upper bound for the number of firms in the initial 
wave of entrants is called for so that firms do not find it profitable to free-ride.86 Second, 
as already mentioned, for a symmetric duopoly to be the outcome of a Nash equilibrium of 
the coalition formation game, then apart from stand-alone stability, it is also necessary that 
no firm will have incentives to unilaterally deviate by migrating to the rival coalition in the
86 Notice that lim ^ o o  N  (ƒ?, a) | v=2m =  8 and €  [0, l j , 8 | | — <  4, the minimum number of 
firms that should enter at stage 1 in order for a merger to a symmetric duopoly to be feasible at the second 
stage. Therefore, the stand-alone stability requirement fails to hold, which in turn implies that no merger to 
(symmetric) duopoly can occur in exogenous sunk cost industries. This is so since in such industries firms’ 
only incentive to merge is to reduce competition in the market. Firms in this type of industries do not raise 
the quality level above unit and, therefore, affording a cost reduction through the elimination of duplication 
efforts in R&D is obviously not feasible.
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same coalition structure. The next Proposition shows that this latter stability requirement 
is always satisfied in our framework and, therefore, stand-alone stability turns out to be a 
necessary and sufficient condition for a coalition structure composed of two equal sized 
individual coalitions to be the outcome of a Nash equilibrium of the coalition formation 
game.
Proposition 3 Let C  =  {C\, C2} be the coalition structure induced by firms’ announce­
ments a  =  (5 1, S N). If coalitions Ca and C2 are equal sized, then C is the outcome o f  
a Nash equilibrium if and only i f  C is stand-alone stable.
Proof. From Definition 2, one has that for a coalition structure C to be the outcome 
of a Nash equilibrium, no firm should have incentives to either unilaterally move between 
the two coalitions C\ and C2 when that is feasible or to stay alone in a new singleton 
coalition. Hence, in order to show that stand-alone stability is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for C  =  {Ci, C2} to be the outcome o f a Nash equilibrium, all we have to 
show is that unilateral migrations between C: and C2 are not profitable deviations. Con­
sider a strategy profile in which S 1 =  ... =  S N^ 2 — {1,..., iV/2}, and S'JV^2+1 =  ... =  
S N =  {z, N /2  +  1,..., N }t where i G { 1 , N /2}. The outcome of this strategy profile is 
C =  {C i, C2}, where C\ =  {1,..., AT/2} and C2 — {N/2  +  1,..., N}.  Given this strategy 
profile, firm i can leave its actual coalition and join coalition C2 by an individual deviation, 
Cj(i) — C2. However, it is straightforward to show that firm i will not find this feasible de­
viation profitable. By sticking to the above-mentioned strategy profile, firm i earns a share 
2/N  o f the coalition Ci net profit S k (u |2 ,t;) -  F*(2; 5, cr), whereas by changing its an-
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nouncement to S l =  {¿, N/2 4 - 1 , N }  firm i will be worse-off. Its new payoff is given 
by a (lower) share 2/(N  -I- 2) of the same profit S tt (u |2, u) — F* (2; 5 , cr). This completes 
the proof. ■
The results given in Propositions 2 and 3 may be illustrated using Figure 2.
Figure 2 is constructed for a given value of the cost parameter ¡3. The regions between 
the dashed vertical lines correspond to the ones in Figure 1, but now they are split in terms 
of the values assumed by a. In addition, the two upward sloping curves N  (/3, a)\ and
N  (P*<r)\Ns=2m 316 re a^te^ t0 conditions (3.113) and (3.117), respectively. In particular, 
when N  < N  (/3i a)\N=m (respectively, N  < iV'(/?Ja ) |Ar=2ni), then condition (3.113) 
(respectively, condition (3.117)) holds. Hence, given the number of entrants N , a coalition 
structure composed of a single ‘grand’ coalition (respectively, two equal sized duopoly 
coalitions) is stand-alone stable for sufficiently high values of a. The intuition behind this 
result is that, the higher the degree of substitution between product varieties (the higher the
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value of ¿7), the tougher the price competition will be at the last stage of the game. This 
in turn implies that the higher <7 is, the lower profit margins are and, therefore, the less 
profitable will a deviation towards the creation of a new singleton coalition be. Appendix
3.A, studies the properties of the curves N  { P ^ ) \N=m and N  (&<r)|N_2m which justify 
the pattern presented in Figure 2.
Notice that in Region A, i.e., for a > 2(0 — 2)//?, the unique prediction of the coali­
tion formation game is a merger to monopoly, whatever the number of firms that decided 
to enter at stage 1 is. This is so because, as explained above, in this region one can have 
at most one coalition earning non-negative profits at equilibrium (see discussion of Figure 
1 above). In the remaining regions, given the number of entrants N , the prediction will 
depend on the specific value assumed by <7 . For any pair (iV, <7) below the N  (/?, *)l N=m 
curve, a single ‘grand* coalition can be supported as a Nash equilibrium outcome of the 
coalition formation game. Likewise, for any pair (N,cr) below the N  (¡3, cr)\N=2m curve, 
a duopoly coalition structure composed of two equal sized coalitions is stand-alone stable 
and, hence, can be supported as a Nash equilibrium outcome.
Note that applying the Nash stability concept to the coalition formation game does 
not give very sharp predictions as to the coalitions that are likely to form in equilibrium. As 
shown by Figure 2, when a <  2(/? — 2)//?, all the region below the N  (/?, a ) | curve is a 
region where multiple Nash equilibria exist for the coalition formation game. In addition, it 
is also straightforward to show that for all pairs (N , a) in Region B> any duopoly coalition
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structure can be supported as the outcome of a Nash equilibrium of the coalition formation 
game.87
To try and obtain sharper predictions about stable coalition structures which can arise 
at equilibrium, the next section will introduce a new stability concept which differs from 
Nash stability in two respects. First, stability will also be required with respect to deviations 
by a group o f players (from the same coalition or from different ones), holding the strategy 
of the other players fixed. Second, firms are assumed to be farsighted. When making a 
decision, each coalition will take into account the future reactions of other coalitions to 
such a decision. This foresight is assumed to be common knowledge.
Farsighted stability
The analysis in this section will be performed in two steps. First, firms’ incentives 
to participate in group deviations are studied. We then introduce a stability concept which 
not only requires stability with respect to individual as well as group deviations, but also 
assumes players are not myopic when considering deviations from the status quo coalition 
structure they belong to.
Let us start by considering the possibility that a group of players (from the same 
coalition or from different coalitions) forms a new coalition. Two different checks are in 
order at this point: (1) analyzing whether a group of players have incentives to create a new 
coalition whose size is smaller than the size of the coalition(s) they are departing from; and
87 If we focus on strategies of the type considered in Proposition 1, then stand-alone stability turns out to 
be a necessary and sufficient condition for a coalition structure to be Nash stable. In addition, even though 
Lemma 2 considers only the case of a duopoly composed of two equal sized coalitions, it is straightforward 
to extend its proof and show that any duopoly coalition structure would be stand-alone stable in Region B. 
This is so for the simple reason that 2 is the maximum number of coalitions that can earn non-negative profits 
at equilibrium.
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(2) investigating whether firms initially organized in a duopoly coalition structure have 
incentives to jointly deviate towards complete monopolization of the industry. The two 
next Lemmas analyze these issues.
Lemma 3 Let C  =  {Ci, C2} be the coalition structure induced by firms* announcements 
a =  (S'1, I f  C is stand-alone stable and C\ and Ci are viable, then there is no
profitable deviation towards the creation o f new coalition(s) whose size is no larger than 
the actual size o f  C\, C2.
Proof. Consider the strategy profile in which S 1 =  ... =  Sk =  { 1 and 
S*+1 =  ... =  S N =  {k + 1 , . . . , iV}, where 1 <  k < N /2. The outcome of this strat­
egy profile is C  =  {CUC2}> where C\ — {l,...,fc} and C2 =  {fc + 1 , Suppose 
that C  is stand-alone stable. First, consider the case in which a deviation gives rise to 
the creation of a new coalition whose size is no larger than m in {k, N  — fc}, holding the 
rest of the coalition structure fixed. Let h players included in C\ and / players belonging 
to C2 (jointly) deviate towards the creation of a new third coalition of size h +  ly where 
0 < h < k, 0 < l < (N — k) and 1 < h +1 < min {&, N  — fc}. The non-deviator mem­
bers of coalition C<f t =  1,2, stay together in a smaller coalition than the initial one since 
they announce exactly the same list of firms. Each of the deviators earns a share l / ( h  +  /) 
of the new coalition net profit S tt ( v  |3, v  ) — F*(3; 5, cr). Notice, however, that by individu­
ally leaving its coalition and forming a one-firm coalition, a deviator would earn the whole 
profit 57t (u |3, v )  — F ’(3; S , o). But, since C is stand-alone stable by hypothesis, none of 
these deviations is profitable.
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Second, let us consider the case in which there is a deviation by a group of players 
towards the creation of several smaller coalitions. From the deviators point of view, the 
best deviation scenario would be the creation of two new singleton coalitions. Let j  players 
included in C\ and t players belonging to C2 jointly deviate towards the creation of two 
singleton coalitions, where 0 <  j  <  2, 0 <  i <  2 and j  +  f =  2. When this is the 
case, each deviator will earn a payoff of S ty ( v  |4, v ) — F*(4; S , a ) .  Notice, however, using 
(3.108) one concludes that
S ty(v \N2ì v ) ~ F ' ( N 2; S , g)  =  l p { 2 - a ) - 2 ( 2  + <t (N2 - 2 ) )  
F*{N2;S,(t) 2 2 +  <t (JV2 - 2 )
(3.118)
Now, from (3.118) one has that
_d_ ( S7Y(v\N2, v ) - F * ( N 2]S t (r)\  ^  __1 
dN2 \  F '(N2;S,c) )  2
<7/? (2 — a )
< 0 . (3.119)
(2 +  <7 (Ni — 2))2
In addition, notice that =  iF^  where v, the (symmetric) equi-
librium quality level, is given by (3.100). Now, since, on the one hand, from (3.91), 
>  0 and, by Lemma 1 < 0, on the other, one concludes that —   ^ <  0.
Combining this result with eq. (3.119) and applying the implicit function theorem, one con­
cludes that, if Ci and C2 are viable coalitions, then
_  J L  [ S , , ) ]  <  0. When the group
deviation involves the creation of two singleton coalitions, each deviator gets a lower profit 
than in the case in which it unilaterally deviates towards the creation of an unique singleton 
coalition. This result, combined with the stand-alone stability of C, rules out the incentives 
by a group of players towards the creation of several singleton coalitions. This completes 
the proof. ■
■an»'-.r-1— ■ m
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The next Lemma provides the conditions which should be satisfied in order for a 
joint deviation by all players (initially organized in a duopoly coalition structure) towards 
complete monopolization of the industry not to be profitable.
Lem m a 4 Let C  =  {Ci, C2} be the coalition structure induced by firms ' announcements 
a =. (S’1, ..., S N). Let the sizes o f coalitions C\ and C2 be given by k and N  — k, respec­
tively, where 1 <  k < N /2. Then, a joint deviation by all players towards the formation o f 
a monopoly is not profitable i f  and only i f  N  > N DMkf where
K DMk =  k 2(13-2)
p ( 2 - v ) - 4
(2 +  o f  (2 -  a)
8
8
0 - 2
Proof. If initially there are two coalitions C\ and C2 of sizes k and N  — k, respectively, 
1 <  k < N/2,  then firms will have no incentive to jointly deviate towards complete 
monopolization of the industry if and only if the following 2 conditions simultaneously 
hold:
i  [Sx (t, |2,» ) - F*(2; S, <7)] >  l [ S x ( » |l , t » ) - i - ( l ;S , f f ) ] ,  (3.120)
and
[S5rH 2’,;) -  Ì  j f  [ S x ( » | l , v )  -  ¡S,«r)] • (3.121)
Now, since firms in coalition C\ are obviously the ones who have less incentives to partici­
pate in such a (group) deviation, incentive constraint (3.120) is the one that will matter for 
our analysis. Hence, rewriting (3.120) one obtains
1 S k  ( v  |2, v ) ' >  1 ■S7r(v| l,v) * F ’(l;5 ,cr)
k LF-(2;S,<7) J -  N [ f *( i ; s ,<7) J •F*(2;S>) (3.122)
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Now, making use of (3.118), one has that:
S ir(v |l,t> )  1
Sw (v\2 ,v) 1
Hence, one can rewrite condition (3.122) as follows:
£)
°)
(3.123)
Now, using (3.112), after some algebra, the previous condition can be rewritten as:
(3.124)N  > k - S ^ L -  f  I2 =  N n Mt
/? (2 — cr) — 4 \ 8
This completes the proof. ■
The intuition behind this result is as follows. The higher the number of firms N  that 
have entered at stage 1, the lower the share (1 /N) that each firm will get if a joint deviation 
towards monopolization of the industry takes place. In addition, the k firms in the smaller 
coalition C\ are obviously the ones with less incentives to participate in such a deviation.88 
This in tum implies that if the number of firms that have decided to enter at stage 1 is 
sufficiently large, then firms in the smallest coalition C\ will not agree to form a single 
‘grand’ coalition.
Let us now tum  to the introduction of a new (coalition) stability concept which not 
only requires stability with respect to group deviations of the type just described, but also 
amends the firm’s myopic behavior embedded in the Nash stability notion described in the 
previous section. It will be assumed that players are fully farsighted, which, as pointed out 
by Chwe (1994), means that “a coalition considers the possibility that, once it acts, another
88 Firms in coalition C\ are the ones which get the highest share of the duopoly profits (net of fixed costs).
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coalition might react, a third coalition might in turn react, and so on, without lim it” (p. 
300) Hence, we assume an environment of coalition formation in which deviations can be 
followed by further deviations. This being the case, then what matters is not only to analyze 
whether a deviation by some player(s) is vulnerable to further deviations, but also, and most 
importantly, to identify the ultimate result of such a deviation. This ultimate result, being, 
by definition, immune to further deviations, must be in the solution set of the coalition 
formation game.
Assume that coalition structure C  =  {C^,..., CT} is under consideration (C  is the 
status quo). Now, a coalition D  C {1 ,..., N }  may form and “object to” C. Let Di denote 
the subset of deviant firms belonging to coalition where i =  1,..., T  and D =  u[=1Di. 
After the deviation by coalition D  and before other players eventually regroup, the resulting 
coalition structure is
a  «= {D} U {Q  \  Du i =  X, ... ,T | Ci e  C  and C{ \  A  ^  {0}}; (3.125)
in this case we write C ^  C'. This means that if C  is the status quo coalition structure, 
coalition D can make C' the new status quo. This does not imply that C' can be enforced 
by coalition D. As will be shown, once Cr is the new status quo, then another coalition can 
form and “object to” C", and so on.
Definition 3 Coalitional preferences: Let C — { C \ , C T} be the status quo coalition 
structure. Let Di denote the (possibly empty) set o f deviant firms belonging to coalition 
Ci, i =  1, . . . ,T  and D ~  u[=1Di. Assume that D  C { 1 , N } is formed, giving rise to 
the coalition structure C \ defined by eq. (3.125). Coalition D strictly prefers C' to C,
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denoted C' y p  C, if  for all i € Di, Di ^  {0}, where i = 1, II (£>; C") >  II (C<; C).
In words, the acting coalition D  strictly prefers the induced coalition structure C1 to the 
status quo coalition C  if all its members are better off after D is formed (and stays formed 
until the next move). However, as stressed above, at any point in time, some firm(s) might 
form a new coalition and change the (new) status quo coalition structure. The coalition 
formation game is over when an ultimate coalition structure is reached, i.e., when no firm 
has incentives to further deviate from this coalition structure. The next definitions formalize 
this idea of foresight in the coalition formation game.
Definition 4 Dominance: Take two coalition structures C and C'. C' is said to dominate 
C, C  > C, if there exists a sequence o f coalition structures C 1, C 2, Ck such that C1 =  
C and Ck = C' and a sequence of coalitions Dl ,D 2, ...,Dk such that 0  —> Cj+1 and 
C j+1 0 , fo r  all j  = 1.
Definition 5 Farsighted stability: The coalition structure C is said to be farsighted stable 
i f  there does not exist another coalition structure C' such that C1 > C.
In what follows, we will apply this concept of farsighted coalitional stability to our setting 
in order to obtain predictions about the coalitions that are likely to form in equilibrium. 
Two notes are in order at this point. First, we will focus our analysis on regions A  and 
B  of the previous Figures. In other words, our aim is to predict the equilibrium structure 
of the industry at hand for sufficiently high values of the substitutability parameter <r, i.e.,
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for <7 €  [2(/? — 2 )/ (0 +  2 ), l] .89 This is for model tractability reasons.90 Second, as the 
previous discussion suggests, when solving the overall game and applying the concept of 
farsighted stability, we have to take into account the possible eventual deviations are as fol­
lows. When players are initially organized in a monopoly coalition stmcture, then the only 
feasible deviation is an individual deviation towards the creation of a singleton coalition 
(monopoly stand-alone stability). If, instead, the status quo coalition structure is a duopoly 
one, then players can not only deviate towards the formation of a singleton coalition, but 
also jointly deviate towards the complete monopolization of the industry. All other kinds 
of deviations have been shown to be unfeasible or unprofitable.
The study of the farsighted stable coalition structures that can arise in equilibrium 
will be done jointly with the determination of the equilibrium number of entrants at the 
first stage of the game. This analysis will be developed in the next section and will give 
rise to the main result of this chapter.
Entry stage
We are now in position to analyze firms’ entry decisions at the first stage of the game 
and so determine the equilibrium structure of the industry. By so doing, our objective is 
twofold: (i) determine the number of pre-merger entrants at stage 1, and (it) characterize 
the coalition structure that is likely to occur at equilibrium at the second stage, assuming
89 Obviously, requiring that products are sufficiently good substitutes, where the minimum threshold value 
for a  depends on 0, is equivalent to require that investment in R&D is sufficiently effective, i.e., 0  € 
(2, 2(2 4- o ) f  (2 —  <?)].
90 If cases in which a  <  2(0 -  2 )/ {0 4- 2) were considered, then one would have to also study the stability 
of coalition structures composed of more than two coalitions and the associated feasible deviations of firms 
involved in such coalitions.
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that players are endowed with foresight in that they look at many steps ahead and consider 
only credible outcomes of the coalition formation game of stage 2.
As already mentioned, we are restricting the analysis the cases in which 
<j 6 [2(/? — 2)/ (/? 4- 2 ) , 1] - Regions A  and B  of the previous figures. We know that 
in region A, B , the maximum number of coalitions earning non-negative profits at equilib­
rium is one and two, respectively. Hence, let us start by computing the upper bounds to 
the number firms that can enter at stage 1 without incurring in losses, anticipating that a 
monopoly or a duopoly coalition structure is going to be formed at stage 2, respectively.
If firms anticipate that a monopoly coalition structure is going to be formed in equi­
librium at stage 2, then at the first stage of the game firms will enter up to a point at which 
N  is the (largest integer) value satisfying:
j f ( S n ( v \ l , v ) -  F*(l; S, a)) >  e, (3.126)
or, equivalently,
_1_
N (l;S,<r) (3.127)
For the sake of simplicity, write JV as a continuous variable for the moment Then, from 
(3.118), one has that (S jt(v |1 ,v ) -  F'{l;S,c))/F*(l;S,< r) =  ( 0 - 2 )/2 . Hence, eq. 
(3.127) can now be solved for the equilibrium number o f entrants at stage l ,  N , obtaining:
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, v / „ N 0 / G 9 - 2 )
Finally, combining (3.91) and (3.100), one has that F * ( l ;5 , cr) =  . This in
turn implies that the previous condition can be rewritten in the following way:
Notice that, as expected, N^f increases with the market size S  and is a decreasing
—Mfunction of the entry cost e. In particular, N € —> oo as S  —► oo or e —*■ 0.
Take now the alternative case in which firms, at stage 1, anticipate that in the second 
stage o f the overall game, the equilibrium outcome of the coalition formation game is 
coalition structure C  =  {Ci, C2}, where the sizes of coalitions Ci, C2 are given by ky 
N  — k, respectively, 1 <  k < N/2. If this is the case, then the number of firms that decide 
to enter at stage 1 will be the (largest integer) value of N  for which each member of the 
larger coalition C2 will make non-negative profits:
1
N - kz (Sv(v \2 fv ) -F"(2;S,<r) )>e , (3.130)
or, equivalently
S t: (u |2, u ) — F*(2; 5, <r) \  . e
(3.131)N  -  k \  F*(2; 5, a) )  “  F*(2; 5, &)'
Now, since from (3.118), (St: (t? |2,u) -  F*(2;5,o-)) /F*(2 ;S ,cr) =  (p(2 -  o') - 4 )  /4 , 
one can reevaluate the previous inequality and solve for N y obtaining:
N  <  2 ~  4 )  F '(2 ;S ,c ) + k. (3.132)
But, since from (3.91) and (3.100), F*(2; 5, a) =  , one finally has
that:
N *  a P (2 — (j) (2 +  o') (3.133)
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In Appendix 3 .B , properties of the upper bound to the number of firms N ^ k are 
studied. It is interesting to note, in particular, that while N  f  is independent of a, N ? k is 
decreasing in the substitution parameter. The intuition for this is as follows. If a monopoly 
is formed at the second stage of the game, then the unique grand coalition will operate
—Malong a single R&D trajectory and produce a single product. This explains why N e is 
independent of the substitution parameter a. As far as N ^ k is concerned, two reasons 
justify why this upper bound to the number of entrants is a decreasing function of a . First, 
as already mentioned, the higher the substitutability between product varieties in the market 
(the higher the value of a) is, the tougher competition will be at the last stage of the game. 
This implies that the higher a is, the lower profit margins are and, therefore, the lower the 
number of firms that can enter and join a duopoly coalition structure without incurring in 
losses. Second, the higher a is, the less variety is offered in the market and, hence, the lower 
will consumers’ expenditure be on the goods offered by this industry, for given prices. This 
will also imply that increases in cr will induce a decrease in the maximum number of firms 
that can enter earning a non-negative profit in case a duopoly coalition structure is formed 
at the second stage of the game.
For each value of k, k  € {1,2, ...N /2}, equation (3.133) defines a decreasing sched­
ule in the (AT, a) space. Figure 3 shows this family of schedules and also the upper bound to
— A ƒthe number of firms N e , given by eq. (3.129). In addition, Figure 3 presents another fam­
ily of schedules, each of which for a given value of k. This family of schedules is given by 
eq. (3.124) and represents a lower bound to the number of entrants above which a duopoly 
coalition structure of the type C  =  {Cj, C2}, where k and N  — k denote, respectively, the
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sizes of C\ and C2, is stable against group deviations towards complete monopolization o f 
the industry. The intuition for the upward sloping of these curves is as follows. As already 
mentioned, for high values of <r, competition in the product market stage 4 is expected to 
be fierce. Therefore, the higher the value of a is, the more likely is that firms will have 
incentives to jointly deviate towards complete monopolization of the industry in order to 
suppress competition at the product market stage 4. In other words, for a given number of 
pre-merger entrants N, the higher a is, the less likely is that condition (3.124) holds.
Let us now turn to the discussion of the equilibrium structure of the industry. As ex­
plained before, this will be done by applying a refinement of subgame perfection to the 
overall game, where it is assumed that at the second stage players are endowed with fore­
sight. The analysis is going to be performed with the help o f Figure 3, which summarizes 
the relevant stability requirements which we impose on permissible individual and group 
deviations as well as the upper bounds to the number of entrants earning non negative
Egure 3 - Farsighted Stability Conditions
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profits in monopoly and duopoly coalition structures. In what follows, let a* (/?; S, e) de-
—jy __ . —jy
note the value of a implicitly defined by the condition N e = N  (/?, where N e
and iV (ft, are given by eqs. (3.129) and (3.113), respectively. In addition, let
a (/?;£, e) denote the value of <x implicitly defined by condition i v f 1 =  N  
where 77^'1 is given by eq. (3.133), for the specific case in which k = l .91 
The following Proposition puts forward the main result o f this chapter.
Proposition 4 Let a  G [2 (¡3 — 2) /  (/? +  2 ), 1]. Then, there exists a (refined) SPE o f the 
four stage game. Let 77 denote the equilibrium number of pre-merger entering firms in a 
( refined) SPE. Then,- — M
If a > o*, N  — N e and a monopoly coalition structure is formed at the second stage 
of the game, N2 — 1,*
I f a e ( à , c ‘) , N = N { P ,  cr) |N_m and a monopoly coalition structure isformed at 
the second stage ofthe game, N2 =  1;
Otherwise, N  €  k* e  6  {1,2,...,1V/2}| jVDMfc <  and a duopoly
coalition structure isformed at the second stage ofthe game, N2 =  2.
Proof. Two preliminary remarks are in order. First, from Proposition 2 and Lemma 
2, one has that a monopoly coalition structure and a duopoly coalition structure are stand­
alone stable in Region A and £ ,  respectively, of Figures 1 - 3 .  Second, take the cases in 
which a group of N  entrants form a coalition structure of the type C = (C j, C2} at stage
91 In what follows, for the sake of simplicity of notation, we will refer to a* (/?; S, e) and 5  (/3; S, sr), as a* 
and o , respectively.
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2, where k and N  — k denote the sizes of C\> C2, respectively, 1 <  k < N/2. When 
this is the case, due to symmetry and, therefore, without loss of generality, it will be as­
sumed in what follows that =  { 1 , , k} and C2 — {k-\- 1,..., N}. Let us now turn 
to the analysis o f each of the three cases specified above for a  € [2 (/? — 2) /  (/? -f 2 ), l].92 
In the first case, i.e., when a > a*, two different scenarios should be considered. First, 
if a e  [2 (¡3 — 2) //?, 1] (Region A), as mentioned above, one can have at most one coali­
tion earning non-negative profits at equilibrium. As a consequence, firms anticipate that a 
monopoly coalition structure is going to be formed at stage 2. Since, N e represents the 
maximum number of firms in a monopoly coalition structure earning non negative profits 
at equilibrium, one must have that N  =  and N 2 — 1. Second, consider the alter­
native scenario in which a €  [cr% 2 (¡3 — 2) //?). Let us analyze the ensuing subgame for 
each possible value of N. If  N  < N c , a monopoly coalition structure would give non- 
negative profits to all firms and is stand-alone stable since N e < N (p 9<r)\N=m. In ad­
dition, any duopoly coalition structure, although stand-alone stable, would not be stable 
against group deviations towards complete monopolization of the industry, ~N^ < N DMlc, 
k € {1 ,2 ,..., N/2}.  If, instead, N ^  < N  < jVDMl, then a monopoly coalition structure, 
although stand-alone stable (N  <  N  {¡3, a)\N=m = N ° Ml)> implies that all its mem­
bers will earn negative profits at equilibrium (N  > N ^ ) .  In addition, any duopoly coali­
tion structure is not stable towards complete monopolization of the industry, N  < N_DMk* 
k € {1 ,2 ,..., N/2} ,  and we know that in a monopoly firms end up earning negative prof­
92 Actually, as already mentioned, the proof of Lemma 2 is developed for the case in which a duopoly 
coalition structure is composed of coalitions of the same size. None the less, it is straightforward to extend 
that proof and show that any duopoly coalition structure is stand-alone stable in Region B .
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its. Lastly, if N  > 7VDMl, a monopoly coalition structure is not stand-alone stable. Any 
coalition structure of the type C  ** {Ci, C2}, where k and N  — k denote the sizes of 
Cj, C2, respectively and where N  > j  *, N_DMk J , is stand-alone stable and, therefore, 
farsighted stable due to Lemma 3 and Definition 5, but it implies that firms in the larger 
coalition C2 will earn negative profits, N  > Arf \  As a result, one concludes that if a >  cr% 
N  = N™ and N2 = 1.
Next, let us turn to the analysis o f the second case, <r 6  (<r, <r*). As before, let 
us start by analyzing the ensuing subgame for each possible value of N. First, if N  < 
N  (/?, <?)\N=m a monopoly coalition structure gives strictly positive profits to all its mem- 
bers (N < N e ) and is stand-alone stable (N  < N  (/?, (j)| v=m). Moreover, any duopoly 
coalition structure, although stand-alone stable, would not be stable against group devi­
ations towards complete monopolization of the industry since N  (¡3,(r)\N=m < N_DMky 
for k € {1,2 , . . . ,  N/2}.  Second, consider any iV (/?,o)|N=m <  N  < N e . When this 
is the case, then a monopoly coalition structure gives non negative profits to all its mem­
bers, but it is not stand-alone stable. A single grand coalition would, therefore, induce 
a duopoly coalition structure of the type C' =  {C1?C2}, where the sizes of C\ and C2 
are, respectively, 1 and N  — 1. Such a coalition structure is stand-alone sable and, there­
fore, from Lemma 3 and Definition 5, farsighted stable, but would imply that the N  — 1 
firms included in C2 all earn negative profit, N  > iv f 1. It should be also noted that when 
N  (/?, <7)|N=m <  N  < N '1, other duopoly coalition structure might be feasible. In particu­
lar whenever N  > m ax |A f f fc,iV DAijf j ,  k  €  {2,..., N /2}, a coalition structure of the type 
C  =  {Ci, C2}, where k and N  — k  denote the sizes of C j, C2, respectively, although stand­
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alone stable and, thus, farsighted stable due to Lemma 3 and Definition 5, would imply 
that members in the larger coalition would earn negative profits in equilibrium, N  > N f k.
— MLastly, consider any N > N e . In this situation, a monopoly is not stand alone stable 
(N > N  (/?, <r)| ). A monopoly coalition structure would induce a duopoly coalition
structure of the type C' =  {Ci, C^}, where the sizes of C\ and C2 are, respectively, 1 and 
N  — 1. Such a coalition, as explained before for the case N  (/?, o) |N=m <  N  < is far­
sighted stable but implies that the N  — 1 firms in C? earn negative profits. In addition, and 
again as in the case where N  (/?, cr)| N=m < N  < other duopoly coalition structures 
might be feasible but they imply that members in the larger coalition earn negative profits. 
Having said this, one concludes that if  a  €  ( a , c % N =  N {p ,a )\N=maai N 2 = \.
Finally, let us analyze the situation where a, although in region B  does not belong to  
the intervals specified in the 2 previous cases. For this to be the case, one must have that 
a > 2 ( p — 2 ) /(/?  +  2).93 First,forall valuesof N  < TV (/?,cr)|^=m, a monopoly coalition 
structure is stand-alone stable and firms earn non negative profits. However, in equilibrium 
one must have more than N  (/?, a) | N=m firms entering the market. This is so because there 
exists a nonempty set j  N\ N_DMl < N  < N ^ 1 j . For all values of N  in this set, a duopoly 
coalition structure C* — {Cu C2 }, where the sizes of C\ and C2 are, respectively, 1 and 
iV — 1 is stand-alone stable and, therefore, due to Lemma 3 and Definition 5, farsighted sta­
ble. In addition, since in that set N  < 1, all members in the coalition structure C1 earn
non negative profits. Moreover, if N  +  1 firms enter the market, then, since TV^1 +  1 >
93 This will happen for sufficiently small values of e. When e is mall enough, then lim_ a<5-21 N ^ k > N , 
which in turn implies that a > 2 (0 — 2) /  {0 + 2) (see eq. (3.146)).
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max \  N ? Ml J  , for the reasons explained above, a duopoly coalition structure whose 
coalitions sizes are 1 and Aff1 is stand-alone stable and, therefore, farsighted stable as well 
but members of the larger coalitions end up earning a negative profit. Knowing this, the 
initial 1 entrants would only accept the additional entrant in the larger coalition (earn­
ing a negative profit), whose actual members are firms | 2 , ..., N ^ 1 j .  This will discourage 
entry by this additional firm. Notice as well that other duopolies might arise in equilib­
rium, giving rise to a multiple equilibria scenario. In particular, for any N  such that N  > 
N  0®> » ) l w  if ^ ( fc) =  { n > N { P ,  <7))N=m\K DM' < N < N ? \ k € {  2 ,.... N /  2}}, 
a coalition structure C n =  {Ci,C2}, where k and N(k)  — k denote the sizes o f C i, 
C2, respectively, is farsighted stable. In addition, m ax^ N(k) = N £k and, a very sim­
ilar argument to the one used for the case k — l  shows that an additional firm try­
ing to enter the market and join one of the coalitions in C, will only be allowed by in­
cumbents to join coalition C2 and ends up earning negative profits. This justifies why 
N  e  I k' € •[ k  e  { 1 , 2 , N / 2 } \ N dm“ <  jv f* } }  and N2 =  2 in case 3. ■
This result has two central empirical implications. First, notice that independently 
o f the market size and the level of entry costs, arbitrarily concentrated outcomes may be 
supported in equilibrium. Even if S’ —► oo (or £ —> 0), a monopoly coalition structure can
— A /
be supported in equilibrium. As shown by eqs. (3.129) and (3.133), both N £ —> oo and 
N f k —► oo as S  —> oo (or e —► 0). Nonetheless, the previous proposition shows that for 
every a  €  [cr, 1], a merger to monopoly is sustained as the unique outcome of a (refined) 
SPE of the game. Hence, not even in large markets is it generally possible to exclude the 
occurrence of arbitrarily high concentration ratios. Therefore, in endogenous sunk cost
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industries, an upper bound to concentration exists and is independent of the size of the 
market and the level of the entry costs. Second, notice that for o  G (<r,cr*), a monopoly 
coalition structure where firms belonging to it earn strictly positive profits can be sustained 
in equilibrium even under the threat of entry. The intuition which underlies this result 
is that additional entry would rule out the monopoly stand-alone stability and induce a 
very sharp fall in profits. As shown in the proof o f the previous Proposition, whenever 
o e  (ir, a*) and N  > N  (¡3, o-)|N , in any (farsighted) stable duopoly coalition structure
firms belonging to the larger coalition end up earning negative profits. This suffices to deter 
entry by additional firms and maintain a monopoly outcome in which firms earn strictly 
positive profits.
The next Lemma further characterizes the equilibrium structure of the industry by 
identifying duopoly coalition structures which cannot be sustained in a (refined) SPE.
Lem m a 5 Let a  G [2 (¡3 — 2) /  ((3 +  2 ), 2 (¡3 — 2) //?]. Then, a coalition structure C =  
{Ci, C2 ], where k and N  — k denote the sizes o f C\, C% respectively, cannot he sustained 
in a (refined) SPE if
JL 2 .
N > n ’
Proof. From eq. (3.142), we have that lim^ N_dm* =  kN , where N  is given by eq.£+2
(3.135) and 1 <  k < N/2.  Now, since, on the other hand, we know that ( dN°Mk /do) > 0 
(see eq. (3.144)), one concludes that, for all o e  [2 (¡3 — 2) /  (/? +  2 ), 2 (¡3 — 2) //?], a
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coalition structure C  — { C i,^ } »  where k and N  -  k denote the sizes of C\% C2, re­
spectively, is not stable against a joint deviation towards complete monopolization of the 
industry if
or equivalently
N  < lim K DMk =  kN ,
a 0+2
k
N > W
This completes the proof. ■
Hence, when a e  [2 (/? — 2) /  (f3 +  2 ), 2 (/? -  2) //?] (Region B  of Figures 1-3), a 
duopoly coalition structure can only be supported in a (refined) SPE if composed of suffi­
ciently size asymmetric coalitions. The intuition behind this result is as follows. The higher 
the (relative) size of the smaller coalition (as measured by k /N)  is, the lower will be the 
individual share of each firm belonging to that coalition on the coalition overall (duopoly) 
profit. This in turn implies that the higher k / N  is, the more likely is that firms in the smaller 
coalition will be willing to participate in a joint deviation towards complete monopoliza­
tion of the industry, therefore ruling out the (farsighted) stability of the duopoly coalition 
structure to which they initially belong.
3.3 Conclusion
This chapter investigates whether an upper bound to concentration exists and can be charac­
terized in industries where firms are involved in R&D activities with the aim of enhancing 
the perceived quality of their products - endogenous sunk cost industries (Sutton (1991, 
1998)).
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Merger decisions were investigated in a setting where firms have a double incentive to 
participate in a merger. In our framework, a merger leads both to a reduction in the product 
market competition and to a realization of a cost reduction. By merging, firms share the 
(endogenous and fixed) cost associated with the investment in R&D activities. Hence, 
through a merger firms can pursue common research activities, avoid eventual duplication 
efforts in their R&D investments and, as a result, afford a cost advantage over the unmerged 
rivals.
A coalition formation game is proposed to capture the endogenous (horizontal) merger 
formation. The adopted coalitional stability concept differs from Nash stability in two re­
spects. First, stability is also required with respect to deviations by a group of players 
(from the same coalition or from  different ones), holding the strategy of the other players 
fixed. Second, this stability concept assumes firms are endowed with foresight when mak­
ing merger decisions. Firms take into account the future reactions of other coalitions and, 
therefore, anticipate the ultimate result of their actions. This stability concept is shown to 
provide much sharper predictions than the standard Nash stability concept with regards to 
the coalition structures that can arise in equilibrium.
The analysis shows that, in this kind of industries, arbitrarily concentrated outcomes 
can be attained in equilibrium for any market size. In addition, when products are suffi­
ciently good substitutes (or, when investment in R&D is sufficiently effective), coalition 
structures composed of sufficiently size symmetric coalitions cannot arise in equilibrium. 
These results, therefore, complement those of Sutton (1991,1998).
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In this section, we study in detail the properties of the stability requirements which are rele­
vant for the determination of the stable coalition structures which may emerge as equilibria 
outcomes at the second stage of the game. These conditions are given by eqs. (3.113), 
(3.117) and (3.124). The following properties of these stability checks justify the pattern 
of the curves presented in Figures 2 and 3.
3.A.1 Stand-alone stability of a monopoly
As shown in Proposition 2, a monopoly is always stand-alone stable in region A  of Figure 
1, i.e., when 2 <  /? < 4 /  (2 — <r) (or, equivalently 2 (/? — 2) / p  < a  <  1). However, if, 
instead, j3 >  4 /  (2 — a) (or, equivalently, 0 <  c  < 2 (¡3 — 2) //?), then a monopoly will 
only be stand-alone stable whenever condition (3.113) holds.
First, let us study of the limiting properties of N  (/?, cr)|;j_m. Making use of eq. 
(3.113), some algebra shows that
Second, let us use (3.113) to carry out a simple comparative statics exercise with 
respect to the substitution parameter o. By doing so, one concludes that
(3.134)
(3.135)
(3.136)
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which turns out to be always positive because of the following reason. A sufficient condi­
tion for d N  Q3, o ') |^  /da  to be positive is that j3 (2 — o')2 -f a2 -f 6a — 8 >  0, which in 
turn implies that /? >  (8 — a2 — 6a) /  (2 — a)2. Notice, however, that in region B  (Figures
The same will be true for regions C  and D since in those regions ¡3 assumes even higher 
values.
3.A.2 Stand-alone stability of a duopoly
sized coalitions, then this duopoly coalition structure is always stand-alone stable in re­
gion B  of Figure 1, i.e., if  4 /((2  — a ))  <  /? <  2 (2 +  a) /  (2 — a) (or equivalently, if  
2 {P — 2) /  (P +  2) <  a <  2 {ff -  2) jff). If, instead, /? >  2 (2 +  a) /  (2 -  a) (or, equiv­
alently, 0 <  a < 2(/3 — 2 )/( /?  -I- 2), regions C and D  in Figures 1 and 2), then a 
duopoly coalition structure will only be stand-alone stable as long as condition (3.117) 
is satisfied. Let us focus on this latter case and start by studying the limiting properties of 
N  (/?, a) | JV=2m. Making use of (3.117), simple algebra shows that
1-3) this is always the case since there ¡3 >  4 /  (2 — a) and — ' ¡¿lof'  ~  >  0*
As is shown in Lemma 2, if  we consider a coalition structure composed of two equal
ü n w o  N  {P,v)\N=im =  2, (3.138)
N { 0 , o)\n^  =  +oo. (3.139)
Second, notice that from (3.117), one can also show that
(3.140)
- f t 2 (2 -  o f  +  0  (1 -  u) (8 -  a) (2 +  a) +  2cr (7a +  a1 +  2) -  16
(P -  2) (1 + a) (2 (2 + a) -  0 (2 -  <r))2
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which turns out to be positive since V/? >  2Vcr e  |o, 2^ T22^ J ,
( - 0 2 (2 -  a ) 2 +  0  (1 -  a )  (8 -  a ) (2 +  a )  +  2tr (7a +  a 2 +  2) -  16) <  0.
3.A 3 The ‘no-deviation to monopoly’ requirement
Eq. (3.124) identifies a lower bound for the number of entrants in order for firms initially 
organized in a duopoly coalition structure not to find it profitable to jointly deviate towards 
the complete monopolization of the industry. Let us start by studying the limiting properties 
o f this lower bound N_DMk :
lim N DMk =  *,a—»0 (3.141)
1 (0  + 2) 16
lim K DMk= k ~ -----------------;  ,  ’  =  kN,2 ((0 + 2)A ) 3
lim K DMt = +oo,g -t-3(0-2)
0+2
(3.142)
(3.143)
where N  is given by eq. (3.135) and, as mentioned above, k denotes the size of the smallest 
coalition in the duopoly coalition structure, 1 <  k < N / 2.
Next, notice that
dKDMk _  .. P (0 (2  -  V?  +  g* +  6 a  - 8 )  {\ (2 +  a )2 (2 -  a))+*
da (2 — a) (2 +  a) (4 -  /? (2 — a))2
which is always positive since, as explained above (see discussion of eq. (3.137)), whenever 
0  >  4 / ( 2  — a) (regions B , C and D in Figures 1-3), then one has that
(/? (2 — a)2 +  a2 +  6a — 8) > 0 ,  which is a sufficient condition for dN°Mk/da > 0.
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3.B U pper bound to the num ber entrants anticipating a 
duopoly coalition structure
In this section, we briefly describe the properties o f the upper bound to the number of firms 
N ^ kt given by eq. (3.133). These properties, justify the pattern of the family of curves 
N f 1, N f  ‘\... presented in Figure 3.
First, from (3.133), simple algebra shows that
™ TfDi — (lim JV7* =
<7—+0 2e
\ —M+ k )  =  +  *,
where N € is given by eq. (3.129). In addition,
lim JVf * =, ne-2)0+2
{ 0 - 2 ) S &  f(0 + 2)<&) 
(64 A )  ( p & y  (0 + 2)t
- +  k
(3.145)
(3.146)
lim JV?‘ =  Jfc. (3.147)
Next, notice that
d N ?  _ 1  /  S  ( 2 - g f / ?  +  <72 +  6 < r - 8
d<7 2P \ 0 { 2 - a ) ( 2  + <r)2J  (2 +  a) (2 -  a) { 0 - 2 )e  ’
(3.148)
which turns out to be always negative since, as mentioned above (see discussion of eq.
(3.137)), (/? (2 -  a f  +  a1 +  6<r -  8) >  0, whenever /? >  4 /  (2 -  a) (regions B , C  and D 
in Figures 1-3).
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